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This thesis looks at bestselling biographies and memoirs in contemporary urban 
China to trace an underlying narrative of the nation that is common to all such texts, 
and which can thus be usefully identified as a popular history of the PRC.  
 
To situate the phenomenon of bestselling books in historical context, I first provide a 
brief history of publishing in China from the late imperial period to the present. 
Education and publishing in the Ming and Qing are presented as channels for 
ideological indoctrination strongly dominated by the imperial state. In the republican 
interregnum that followed, the struggle between the KMT, CCP and Japanese forces 
for control over the presses then cemented the function of publishing as a means of 
modern political control as well. Under CCP domination in the Mao era, this political 
function of publishing was exercised to maximum effect and climaxed in the Cultural 
Revolution, when virtually all publishing activities were propagandistic exercises 
dictated by the state.  
 
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the onset of economic reform, however, 
rapid marketization of the publishing industry has led to an erosion of this long-
established mode of state control. The financial demands of a commercial book 
market increasingly force publishers to prioritize profitability over the ideological 
interests of the state, and to pander to audience desires in the bid to generate sales. A 
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product of this new industry structure, the contemporary bestseller can thus be seen as 
a nexus of the state, the market and the people. 
 
One major genre in this new bestseller industry is that of biographies and memoirs. 
Widely seen as a subgenre of history, these books cater to broad consumer demands 
for easily accessible, entertaining yet factual insights to the life stories of Chinese 
people (Zhongguo ren 中国人) in particular. Selecting six such titles as case-studies, 
this thesis argues that while the narratives told of individual Chinese lives are diverse, 
all are set within a single common metanarrative that is the historical narrative of the 
Chinese nation. This bestselling history of the PRC traces a linear path of progress 
from destructive political passion in the past to productive economic sensibility in the 
present. From madness and material deprivation in the Cultural Revolution, China is 
portrayed as having matured and awakened to level-headed pragmatism and plenty 
since the inception of Dengist economic reform. The present is depicted as the 
realization of China’s return to rationality, to its proper historical path, and hence as 
the best time to be alive in the history of the nation to date. 
 
While favorable to state interests in several ways, this national metanarrative is not 
simply dictated and disseminated by the central government but is shaped also by 
existing preferences in the consumer market for Chinese history. Biographies and 
memoirs are particularly well-received in this market because they conform to such 
audience expectations as an inclination towards collective subjectivity and an 
amorphous distinction between objective and subjective truth. Through a combination 
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of state sanction, circulation by profit-driven market forces and consumption by an 
audience that continuously finds pleasure in its reading then, the narrative of the 
nation that bestselling biographies and memoirs carry becomes a popular history of 
the PRC that is prevalent in Chinese cities today. 
 v
CHAPTER 1:  
THE CONCEPT OF ‘THE POPULAR’ IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
 
Both in and outside of China, the history of the nation-state since 1949 has often been 
regarded as an exceedingly tumultuous one. It is a history characterized by 
ideological extremes, economic upheaval, political mass movements and above all 
rapid change – the most recent of which is the seemingly absolute turnabout from 
communism to teeming capitalism that is currently underway. As economic 
development rapidly transforms the landscapes and lives of the Chinese people, much 
of the population now find themselves living in a China that is radically different 
from the one in which they were born and raised. How do Chinese people understand 
the drastic changes that have shaped their lives and the life of their nation over the 
past fifty years? What implications do these opinions have for issues of Chinese 
national identity and culture in the present and future? This study aims to examine 
common conceptions of China’s history since 1949 through biographies and memoirs 
that have recently achieved bestseller status in the domestic urban book market. It 
highlights historical events and patterns that these life stories trace in common, to 
identify narratives of the nation’s socio-economic, political and generational change. 
These narratives fall together to form the meta-narrative of China’s national history 
within which Chinese people’s life histories are invariably set. Widely circulated in 
various forms, this narrative of the nation constitutes and can be usefully read as a 
popular history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that is aboard in Chinese 
cities today.  
 
 1
‘The Popular’ as Consumer Masses 
 
The question of ‘the popular’ in the context of contemporary China has drawn 
increasing attention in Western academic research particularly since the early 1990s. 
As economic reform began to generate new levels and forms of mass consumption, 
many hailed the coming of a Chinese consumer revolution and eagerly anticipated the 
subsequent emergence of a popular consumer culture in China. Cultural 
anthropologists such as Deborah Davis, Judith Farquhar, Tani Barlow and Richard 
Krauss have made useful contributions in this vein, through their respective studies of 
family, health, gender and sexuality, and art and public space.1 Enthralled by the 
economic and social transformations that are rapidly redefining everyday life and 
lifestyles, these China-watchers have focused their attention on ‘the popular’ as 
purchasing masses in a new economic equation of free market forces and 
consumerism. Some see the economic activity of ‘the popular’ thus defined as 
politically subversive by default, in that the freedom of consumer choice empowers 
the individual and thus necessarily contributes towards a general erosion of state 
control. Ever determined to prove the applicability of postmodern theory to 
contemporary China, for example, Zhang Xudong celebrates the multifarious signs 
                                                 
1  See Deborah Davis, “Introduction: A Revolution in Consumption” and  “Commercializing 
Childhood: Parental Purchases for Shanghai’s Only Child” in The Consumer Revolution in Urban 
China, ed. Deborah Davis (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 1-24 and pp. 54-
79; Judith Farquhar, “For Your Reading Pleasure: Self-Health (Ziwo Baojian) Information in 1990s 
Beijing,”  positions Vol. 9 No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 105-127; Judith Farquhar, Appetites: Food and 
Sex in Postsocialist China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Tani Barlow, “The 
Pornographic City” in Locating China: Space, Place and Popular Culture, ed. Jing Wang (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2005), pp. 190-209; Richard Kraus, The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics 
of Culture (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004); Richard Kraus, “Public Monuments 
and Private Pleasures in the Parks of Nanjing: A Tango in the Ruins of a Ming Emperor’s Palace” in 
The Consumer Revolution in Urban China, ed. Deborah Davis (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2000), pp. 287-311. 
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and spaces generated by market economic activity as naturally constituting a “vast 
discursive space created by a thriving, omnipresent market and a retreating, 
decentralized state power.”2 Others cite burgeoning nightlife in the country’s urban 
areas, for instance, has been cited as evidence of a Habermassian public sphere.3 
While Farquhar and Barlow are more circumspect, they too impute significance to 
‘the popular’ primarily through the perceived socio-political ramifications of new 
lifestyles and finances. The political significance of ‘the popular’ is conceived of only 
as an unintentional, secondary effect of the mass consumer behavior of a highly 
commercialized and equally depoliticized people. Under the socio-economic focus in 
current cultural studies, the only function of ‘the popular’ is to purchase and patronize 
new commodities and facilities, or to undertake work and conduct business so as to 
be able to do so.  
 
This preferred approach to studying popular culture in contemporary China privileges 
the effect of economics over the muted but sustained effect of politics on everyday 
life. A glance at bookshelves and shop windows in China’s urban metropolises may 
indeed suggest that there is a good reason for this. One finds an array of books and 
magazines on themes from finance to fashion to fiction which seem to indicate that in 
contemporary Chinese culture, the political is simply not popular. This aversion to the 
political would be in line with Zhang Xudong’s observation of “the Chinese people’s 
                                                 
2 Zhang Xudong, “Nationalism, Mass Culture and Intellectual Strategies in Post-Tiananmen China,” in 
Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China, ed. Zhang Xudong (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), p. 315. 
3 Feng Chongyi, “From Barrooms to Teahouses: Commercial Nightlife in Hainan since 1988,” in 
Locating China: Space, Place and Popular Culture, ed. Jing Wang (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 
p. 144. 
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collective disgust [and] public indifference, suspicion, and occasional hostility toward 
political readings of culture and everyday life.”4 For Zhang, “the postrevolutionary 
masses in China seem to have slipped comfortably into the ideology-free world of 
market economy with Chinese characteristics.”5  
 
Yet the political opinions and mindsets that are widely thought to have dominated 
Chinese popular consciousness up until the introduction of market economics in the 
late 1970s have not simply disappeared to make room for new retail outlets. Rather, 
they continue to furnish the underlying context within which new lifestyles and 
‘ideology-free’ commodities are situated and made meaningful. Judith Farquhar 
reminds us that while foreign cultural commodities are now being imported and 
consumed in vast quantities, these products “cannot entirely erase (yet) the values, 
commitments, and expectations of readers who learned to be Chinese before the 
1980s.” 6  The same object represents a different cultural commodity to “the 
historically constituted consumer, [which in China are a] people for whom the 
monologue of Maoist discourse is gone but not entirely forgotten.”7 While she is very 
conscious that the position of Chinese people today is a historically particular one 
however, Farquhar seems to feel unequipped to comment definitively on the precise 
nature of their historical constitution. She can say with certainty only that “a lot of 
people still have a historical consciousness that can tell the difference between then 
                                                 
4 Zhang, “Nationalism,” p. 324. 
5 Ibid., p. 319. 
6 Judith Farquhar, “For Your Reading Pleasure,” p. 125. 
7 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
 4
and now,”8 and hazards the vague hypothesis that this inarticulate awareness may 
construe identity as the fact of belonging to “a people with a shared past.”9  
 
This inability to discern and describe the role of history in contemporary Chinese 
popular culture points to a lacuna in the approach which conceives of ‘the popular’ 
only through the socio-economic implications of its new consumer cultures. How 
does one access and account for those carried over qualities of the popular that are not 
expressed in its new consumer lifestyles? Liu Kang articulates this as the mind-
boggling question that arises when the Maoist masses of socialist China are suddenly 
transformed into the consumer masses of a free market economy.10 He proposes the 
concept of “post-politics,” a situation in which everything is political yet at the same 
time nothing is political, and politics becomes indistinguishable from every aspect of 
everyday life.11 Politics becomes a power struggle over images and symbols, for 
which popular culture is the primary arena of competition.12 While the analytical 
mechanics of this theory too remain vague, what does become clear is the need for a 
conception of ‘the popular’ that is able to take into account political, national and 
historical factors in addition to those of lifestyle consumerism. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 125. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Liu Kang, “Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses,” in Postmodernism & China, ed. Arif 
Dirlik and Zhang Xudong (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 123-144. 
See also Liu Kang, “The Rise of Commercial Popular Culture and the Legacy of the Revolutionary 
Masses,” in Globalization and Cultural Trends in China, ed. Liu Kang (Hawaii, HI: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2003). 
11 Liu Kang, “Popular Culture,” p. 127. 
12 Ibid., pp. 128-130. 
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Popular Culture and the State 
 
One noteworthy contribution in this direction is the special issue of the journal 
positions dedicated to Chinese Popular Culture and the State. In her introduction to 
the volume, Jing Wang highlights the tendency in studies of Chinese popular culture 
to valorize the popular as the necessarily autonomous, liberal and critical voice of the 
“unofficial,” pitted against a vilified, statist and propagandistic conception of the 
“official.”13 She warns us against the construction of this binary as not only reductive 
and essentializing but in the context of post-socialist China, also fundamentally 
misleading. While “conceptual habit”14 may tempt us to draw an official-unofficial 
divide, she argues, it should be recalled that popular culture throughout the history of 
socialist China was understood and generally functioned as the proper domain of the 
state. In his contribution to the volume on the Chinese genealogy of “the people” and 
“people’s culture,” Li Hsiao-ti traces political interest in the popular from the CPC’s 
projects of “cultural mobilization” along radical ideological lines from the 1930s on, 
back to the May Fourth intellectuals’ bid to enlighten the illiterate masses in and 
around 1919.15 Going back further, one can even find evidence of dynastic state 
efforts to control popular culture in late imperial China, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
                                                 
13 Jing Wang, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,”  positions Vol. 9 No. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 2. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Li Hsiao-ti, “Making a Name and a Culture for the Masses in Modern China,” positions Vol. 9 No. 1 
(Spring 2001), p. 50. 
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The popular in the context of China is not then a new and autonomous space opened 
up by the liberating forces of the post-Deng market economy. Rather, it is an age-old 
arena whose political potential has long been recognized, exploited and vigorously 
contested. Indeed, the one line of continuity Li Hsiao-ti traces throughout the 
twentieth century is the sheer persistence with which different polities have sought to 
define and control popular culture. “What remains unchanged,” he writes, “is the zeal 
with which the party/state always strives to transform popular culture into something, 
be it message or money. The party/state has been appropriating [the realm] all 
along.”16 To construct a conceptual framework capable of engaging the full history 
and character of popular culture in post-Mao China thus requires what Jing Wang 
calls “the reinsertion of the state question back into contemporary Chinese cultural 
studies.”17
 
One area of popular culture research in which the role of the state is in fact frequently 
taken into consideration is industry studies of the mass media. Work in this field by 
Lee Chin-chuan, Zhao Yuezhi, Daniel Lynch and Hans Hendrischke among others 
provides insights into the intricate power-play that ensues amongst central and local 
governments, state and private, legal and illegal media production companies.18 Their 
                                                 
16 Li, “Making a Name,” p. 61. 
17 Wang, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” p. 7. 
18  Lee Chin Chuan, “The Global and the National of the Chinese Media: Discourses, Market, 
Technology and Ideology” in Lee Chin Chuan ed., Chinese Media, Global Contexts (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 1-31; Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the Party 
Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998) ; Zhao Yuezhi, “Underdogs, 
Lapdogs and Watchdogs:  Journalists and the Public Sphere Problematic in China” in Edward Gu and 
Merle Goldman ed., Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2004), pp. 43-74; Daniel Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics and ‘Thought Work’ in 
Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Hans Hendrischke, “Popularization 
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findings suggest a Chinese state that is highly adaptive to new market economy 
conditions, and thus likely to maintain a large measure of influence over popular 
media culture for a significant time to come. In his contribution to the positions 
special, David Goodman thus warns against the tendency to overstate state control 
over popular culture up to and during the Cultural Revolution, and underplay its 
influence over popular culture today.19 He notes the multifarious overt and covert 
ways in which the state now wields influence over the domain in its new role as 
facilitator rather than coercer of the media industries. The state wins a measure of 
cultural producers’ allegiance by providing them “access to capital (funds, equipment, 
and buildings), labor, and political protection,” and through the associational 
connections of former party-state employees, and family relations of current party 
members, now actively shaping the nonstate sector.20 While it may have changed its 
tenor, the state is thus far from surrendering its position as an influential “publisher 
and producer of culture.”21  
 
The ‘reinsertion of the state question’ thus suggests a conception of popular culture 
not as an autonomous public opinion that spontaneously emerges in opposition to the 
state, but as a discursive arena in which the state has long played a significant, if not 
dominant, role in defining. Evaluating the nature and degree of state involvement in 
the culture industries, Goodman concludes that non-state groups may now exercise a 
                                                                                                                                           
and Localization: A Local Tabloid Newspaper Market in Transition” in Jing Wang ed., Locating 
China: Space, Place and Popular Culture (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), pp. 115-132. 
19 David Goodman, “Contending the Popular: Party-State and Culture,” positions Vol. 9 No. 1 (Spring 
2001), p. 247. 
20 Ibid., pp. 248-9. 
21 Ibid. 
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new degree of self-management, “but the net result is likely to be a synthesis of their 
interactions with the party-state.” 22  Jing Wang posits an even more centrally 
definitive role for the state in her analysis of the rise of ‘leisure culture’ in popular 
discourse since 1994 as a state-led initiative. Coordinating policy changes with trends 
set through the mass print media between 1994 and 1996, the state promoted a 
popular discourse and consumption of leisure for its economic profitability and for 
the disciplinary effect on its citizens of membership in a capitalist consumer culture. 
Wang writes: 
 
Not only has the postsocialist state not fallen out of the picture, but it 
has rejuvenated its capacity, via the market, to affect the agenda of 
popular culture, especially at the discursive level. The state’s 
rediscovery of culture as a site where new ruling technologies can be 
deployed and converted simultaneously into economic capital 
constitutes one of its most innovative strategies of statecraft since the 
founding of the People’s Republic.23
 
This assessment points to the inapplicability of any analytical perspective that 
misconstrues ‘the popular’ as purely a function of a new market economy that gains 
influence at the direct expense of receding state control. Rather than threatened by 
them, the state may in fact be the biggest beneficiary of the new innovations and 
opportunities being generated by a less regulated market economy. What is needed in 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 250. 
23 Jing Wang, “Culture as Leisure and Culture as Capital,” positions Vol. 9 No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 
74-78. 
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the study of Chinese popular culture is then the critical framework that Ralph 
Litzinger outlines in his comments on the positions project – one that is able “to treat 
the state as a representational or signifying practice and, at the same time, to 
recognize the state’s ability to control, supervise, police, and discipline societies 
through various technologies of rule.”24
 
Statist and Cultural Nationalism 
 
Chinese nationalism, like most nationalisms, is generally characterized in a negative 
light. Jing Wang, Zhang Xudong and Guo Yingjie have all noted and objected to the 
threatening and sinister character that is often imputed to Chinese nationalism not 
only by the American media but also in academic writings on the topic. Geopolitics 
and reactionary public sentiment aside, one source of this prevalent unease is an 
underlying conflation in anti-nationalist discourse of the conceptual entity of ‘the 
nation’ with that of ‘the state.’ One case in point is Prasenjit Duara’s well-known 
work, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. 
Examining the writings of Chinese nationalist revolutionaries at the turn of the 20th 
century, Duara observes that “modern nationalism seeks to appropriate pre-existing 
representations”25 of what has since become the nation-state, and to reorganize them 
into a unilinear historical narrative that privileges the present day nation-state as telos. 
This serves to legitimize the nation-state as the proper representative of the people, in 
                                                 
24 Ralph Litzinger, “Government from Below: The State, the Popular and the Illusion of Autonomy,” 
positions Vol. 9 No. 1 (Spring, 2001), p. 264. 
25  Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1995), p. 27. 
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the timeless utopia at the end of history. To minimize subsequent challenges to this 
narrative of the nation upon which the legitimacy of the nation-state depends, 
nationalist history overwrites all other narratives of the past that may have the 
destabilizing effect of suggesting alternatives to the present.  
 
Duara’s identification of the historiographic mechanics of certain nationalist histories 
is insightful. Where his critique is somewhat misleading, however, is in its 
construction of “the Nation” as a monolithic force from which all other stories must 
be “rescued.” Referring throughout the book to “the nation” as a single-mindedly 
repressive agent, Duara lumps together the diverse, and in fact often divergent, forces 
of nationalism, statism, and “the global system of nation-states and its discourses.”26 
While nation and state are regularly linked in our constant reference to the ‘nation-
state’ however, they are in fact distinct conceptual entities. Chinese historian Rebecca 
Karl is adamant about this distinction in her critique of Duara’s book as a prime 
example of the “conflation of statism and nationalism” 27  that occludes much 
historical complexity. Whereas statism is the purely pragmatic bid to expand state 
power for practical and discursive control, nationalism is “concept formation,”28 or a 
diverse and changing group of ideas and ideals that are not necessarily undesirable. 
Guo Yingjie makes a similar call in his book, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary 
China: The Search for National Identity under Reform. He contends not only that the 
nation and the state are distinct entities and allegiances, but that nationalism is often 
                                                 
26 Duara, Rescuing History, p. 81. 
27 Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 16. 
28 Ibid., p. 17. 
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that which arises at the disjuncture between the two. Citing Emile Durkheim’s theory 
that nationalist sentiments arise from people’s dissatisfaction with the state’s 
definition of their collective identity, Guo identifies a form of cultural nationalism in 
China that originates from the people rather than the state.29  
 
Cultural nationalism, unlike state nationalism, is a societal movement that operates 
both in symbiotic tandem with as well as in direct competition to, the agendas of the 
state. As defined by Guo, state nationalism is Party-centered and attempts to deploy 
nationalism as a supplementary ideology to an increasingly irrelevant Marxism, so as 
to facilitate the accretion of power for the CCP.30 Cultural nationalism, meanwhile, 
prioritizes a vaguely defined cultural “Chineseness” above all else and thereby 
marginalizes all issues of state politics and undermines the governing polity that 
concerns itself with these. It was ironically the CCP’s promotion of state nationalism 
to reinvigorate popular spirits after the morale-destroying events at Tiananmen in 
1989, which first opened the path for non-Party-initiated forms of cultural nationalism 
to enter into broad circulation. In an effort to muster support and optimism from 
among a public recently traumatized by the sight of their own army opening fire on 
peacefully protesting students, the central government introduced into the various 
mass media channels a flood of programs on traditional and folk art forms, for 
instance. While the state saw this as a practical tool for political indoctrination that 
would help to “stabilize public mood” in the interests of the government, cultural 
                                                 
29 Guo Yingjie, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under 
Reform (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
30 Ibid., p. 31. 
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nationalists used the state-orchestrated resurrection of traditional culture to promote 
culture for its own sake, as an end in itself.31  
 
Although competitive in certain ways, state and cultural nationalism are also mutually 
reinforcing. Their ideologies are together, for instance, in their desire to see the 
Chinese people as a “united front.”32 A strong state is not inimical to the cultural 
nationalist agenda, as indeed, it would be conducive for the achievement and 
perfection of cultural “Chineseness.” The difference is merely that cultural 
nationalists prioritize a civilizational, culturally defined Chinese identity above that 
which is proposed by the state. State and cultural nationalism thus strengthen one 
another where political and cultural identities and interests are aligned. This is 
especially likely when the two are set up in opposition to a foreign threat. 33  
Circulating through similar channels and often in identical terms, the two are closely 
entwined, constantly subverting and reinforcing each other. In the CCP’s efforts to 
shift its role and image away from that of a “class party” towards that of a “national 
party,” for instance, it has apparently “taken on board some of the ideas and elements 
of cultural nationalism.”34
 
While Guo’s analysis of cultural nationalism is comprehensive in its coverage of a 
range of topics from Confucianism to linguistics however, his almost exclusive focus 
on the leaders and producers of these trends leads him to largely ignore the question 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 34. 
32 Ibid., p. 35. 
33 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
34 Ibid., p. 143. 
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of their popular reception. Guo discusses cultural nationalism as a popular 
phenomenon, yet avoids any direct examination of the character and scale of popular 
responses. What his study most convincingly reveals is then the presence of an 
intellectual elite who are, or at least aspire to be, at the helm the movement. The 
struggle between state and cultural nationalism that he depicts is thus one waged 
between the state and small pockets of (possibly highly marginalized) cultural-
intellectual elite.  
 
A similar depiction of cultural nationalism as a movement orchestrated by the elite is 
also put forward by Arif Dirlik. Observing that Orientalist tropes feature as 
commonly in Chinese nationalist histories as they do in Western conceptions of China, 
Dirlik suggests that a process of self-orientalization is at work in these histories’ 
appropriation of Orientalism’s culturally essentializing tropes and images of 
homogeneity.35 He situates the producers of these generalizations in an East-West 
“contact zone” populated by the cultural-political elite, who carefully select material 
from both sides to construct an essentialized Chinese identity. The same identity is 
then projected into the West for commercial profit, and into China to generate 
patriotism. Referring elsewhere to Chinese identity as a “myth of cultural unity” and a 
“strategy of cultural containment,”36 Dirlik tends to emphasize the role of the political 
and cultural elite while neglecting the agency of the rest. Regarding nationalist 
                                                 
35 Arif Dirlik, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, Vol. 35 No. 4, 
Theme Issue 35: Chinese Historiography in Comparative Perspective (December 1996), pp. 96-118.  
See also Q Edward Wang, “Encountering the World: China and Its Other(s) in Historical Narratives, 
1949-1989,” Journal of World History, Vol. 14 No. 3 (2003), pp. 327-358. 
36 Arif Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000) p. 110. 
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identities as ideological ploys orchestrated by the state, disseminated through the 
media and only finally manifest in society as a generalized cultural nationalism, he 
represents ‘the masses’ as mere passive receivers of government-dispensed 
sentiments and values. He thus neglects the role that all other transmitting agents, 
down to and including the final consumer of a nationalist identity, must actively play 
in order for cultural nationalism to become a socio-cultural reality.  
 
Zhang Xudong, on the other hand, sees cultural nationalism as a mass movement of 
the people that is stridently distinct from the state. Where others have been hesitant to 
conclude one way or another about the possibility of a public sphere in contemporary 
China, Zhang declares that the “proto-middle class has been forming a semi-
autonomous social and cultural space of its own,” in which the trends and movements 
of a “proto-individualistic and proto-civic nationalism” 37  are easily discernable. 
Zhang cites, for example, the alarming commercial success in 1996 of an 
independently penned and published expression of crude Chinese nationalism, China 
Can Say No. Written by a group of young Chinese men, this book was a stridently 
irrational outburst of furious anti-Western and menacingly pro-Chinese sentiment that 
sold 250,000 copies within one month (excluding pirated versions), and generated 
multiple sequels such as China Can Still Say No, Why Does China Say No? and How 
Can China Say No?38 The independent origin and overwhelming popularity of this 
                                                 
37 Zhang, “Nationalism,” pp. 315, 317. 
38 Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee, “Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of 
Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s” in Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming Yeh T. Rawnsley ed., Political 
Communications in Greater China: The Construction and Reflection of Identity (New York, NY: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 41-61. 
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book, Zhang argues, “clearly reveals a realm of social existence decidedly outside the 
state that is striving for its own expression.”39  
 
Zhang’s reminder that nationalism can also be generated by and expressed as mass 
trends within the realm of popular culture is a useful counter to Guo’s and Dirlik’s 
top-down models. His conception of cultural nationalism as “originat[ing in a] mass 
culture or consumer culture” that is conceived of in opposition to an increasingly 
irrelevant and powerless state, however, is reflective of his tendency to project 
imperfectly applicable Western theories and models of civil society on to 
contemporary China. Zhang celebrates newly emergent forms of nationalism, for 
instance, because he sees in them “a modern, secular notion of the nation becom[ing] 
possible for the first time in a land where it has historically been the political state, 
not the ‘natural’ socioeconomic relations of a community, that gives form and voice 
to the nation.”40 Privileging Euro-American conceptions of the nation as constituting 
the ‘modern,’ ‘natural’ and universal norm, Zhang can only see Chinese nationalism 
as a ‘proto,’ incipient and imperfect version of “modern nationalism,”41 rather than as 
a fundamentally different and rapidly changing entity in itself. 
 
Subscribing to this model of a marketized China finally headed in the direction of the 
modern global norm, Zhang too thus falls into the previously mentioned trap of 
perceiving contemporary Chinese popular culture as a purely socio-economic 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., p. 318. 
41 Ibid., p. 321. Zhang claims Chinese nationalism as it has hitherto existed “runs counter to the 
ideology of modern nationalism, which emphasizes individual rights and change.”  
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phenomenon. His excitement over new forms of popular nationalism arises from their 
allowing “us to rethink Chinese nationalism in socioeconomic terms and to 
contemplate its more profound – rather than immediate and narrow – political 
significance in forging a new sense of equality, democracy, individualism, and 
community.” 42  While socio-economic changes will undoubtedly have broad and 
lasting political effects, the implied assumption that current political contexts can 
therefore be summarily dismissed is certainly unwarranted. The newly postsocialist 
masses do not, as Zhang believes, simply slip happily into ideology-free consumerism, 
nor will market economics lead naturally and inevitably to “equality, democarcy, 
individualism and community.” 
  
Finally, Zhang’s strict reliance on a predetermined model of state-society relations 
ultimately leads him to consider Chinese nationalism a vacant and inevitably abortive 
movement. Remaining fixed in his assumption that all meaningfully political 
movements must necessarily be led by an intellectual elite that is independent of the 
state, Zhang considers only “what is missing” in the Chinese approximation of the 
Euro-American model, to find Chinese nationalism represents a “political and 
intellectual vacuum in the so-called fastest growing market in the world.”43 Having 
himself willfully pried apart socio-economic from political factors throughout his 
analysis, that is, he then laments that the “delinking of the state from society [and] 
between political and socio-economic spheres prefigures the fundamental limits of 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 316. 
43 Ibid., p. 324. On p. 341, Zhang writes, “The current discursive space of mass culture and nationalism 
is characterized by general disengagement. That leaves the task of imagining the nation to be 
appropriated either by state discourse, as an official ideology, or by popular sentiment, as a social 
desire. Thus, nationalism becomes a theoretical taboo for intellectuals.” 
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Chinese nationalism.”44 His own refusal to acknowledge the real political contexts 
within which socio-economic upheavals are taking place, thus leads him to construct 
a thoroughly depoliticized popular culture, regrettably in line with “the withering of 
meaningful political life everywhere.”45 Measured against a standard set by Euro-
American precedents, Chinese popular culture is presented not as the complex and 
protean discursive arena that it is, but as failed approximations of what it is not – as a 
doomed project, that is, whose built-in limitations will inevitably block its 
achievement of supposedly universal ideals.  
 
Between Prasenjit Duara’s state-defined nationalism on the one hand and Zhang 
Xudong’s populist but vacant cultural nationalism on the other, a range of 
perspectives on Chinese nationalism thus emerge from studies on the topic to date. It 
remains to be seen which of these will provide the most useful analysis. What has 
become clear is that, perhaps even more so in the case of China than elsewhere,  
distinctions must be made between statist nationalism and cultural nationalism, and 
between nationalism that is disseminated top down by the elite, and nationalism that 
brews bottom up from amongst the masses. 
 
A close association, if not overlap, certainly exists between these variants. Through 
its regulation of and participation in the mass media for example, the state regularly 
seeks to hijack the various strains of nationalism which emerge and channel them in 
the interests of state power expansion. The state is thus in a constant bid to co-op all 
                                                 
44 Ibid., pp. 342-343. 
45 Ibid., p. 344. 
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forms of nationalism and achieve a monopoly on the authority to define ‘the nation.’ 
At the same time, however, other forms of nationalism are always emerging from 
amongst the social and cultural realms of the people. The manifestation of Chinese 
nationalism in reality is thus likely to fall somewhere between Zhang’s sense of a 
civil society movement and Dirlik’s conception of state-defined campaign. The area 
between these two extremes is characterized by an intricate network of material and 
discursive power relations, through which the interests of the people and the state, 
mediated increasingly by the market, negotiate to define new constructions of 
national history and identity.  
 
This study will approach these issues of popular culture and the state through an 
examination of bestselling biographies and memoirs in the historical context of print 
culture in China, as a recent publishing industry phenomenon and finally, as a vehicle 
for historical narratives of the nation. Moving away from the focus on new consumer 
lifestyles to examine national imaginings as popular culture, this study achieves the 
‘reinsertion of the state question’ by presenting popular culture not as that 
effervescence of public and individual autonomy that freely bubbles forth from new 
consumer activities, but as a realm in which an actively participating state has long 
been deeply involved. Indeed, it is the alignment of the interests of the state with 
those of the market and the people that is revealed as uniquely equipping bestselling 
biographies and memoirs with the resources and conditions needed to achieve their 
high levels of circulation. The popular history of the PRC that is circulated in these 
books is thus a co-production by the agents and agendas of these three forces. To 
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better understand the role of the state in this item of contemporary popular culture, 
the long history of publishing in China, out of which current conditions have emerged, 
must first be examined. 
 20
CHAPTER 2:  
THE BOOK INDUSTRY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Late Imperial Ming-Qing China, 1368-1911 
 
A dramatic expansion occurred in education and book publishing during the Ming 
(1368-1644) and continued through to the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). 
Unprecedented population growth from the mid-Ming led to a rise in the number 
of men seeking entrance to the civil service through the government’s recruitment 
system of imperial examination. Administrative changes to the exam system, 
which reduced the number of hereditary positions and broadened the criteria for 
candidature to include a wider segment of the population, further increased the 
number who sought an education in the hope of entering the service.1 Outside the 
realm of official education, increasing levels of inter-regional trade and mobility 
also began to cause a growing reliance on writing and reading in everyday life. By 
the mid-Qing dynasty, commercialization and urbanization had made literacy a 
skill that was valued and acquired simply as a necessity to protect one’s own 
interests in the marketplace.2 Historian Evelyn Rawski estimates that a literacy 
rate of one-third to half of schooling-age males was achieved during the Ming, 
and would only have increased during the Qing dynasty.3 Growth in population 
and trade in late imperial China thus led to an expansion of the education system 
                                                        
1 Evelyn Rawski, “Economic and Social Foundations,” in Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, ed. David 
Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan and Evelyn Rawski (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 
11-12. 
2 Susan Naquin and Evelyn Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (CT: Yale University Press, 
1987), p. 58.
3 Rawski, “Economic,” p. 11. 
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and the book publishing activities associated with it. While books had previously 
been a highly collectible and actively traded commodity among the cultural and 
intellectual elite, they now began to be seen as objects of common necessity even 
beyond the literati. Libraries and schools, for instance, had long existed in small 
numbers, but “it was only in the Ming that a school, even down at the county level, 
was expected to have a library.”4  
 
While external factors may have accelerated the process, this expansion in the 
system of literacy and communication was an initiative of the imperial 
government, which remained by far the single greatest influence within it. From 
the outset, the only plausible reason for seeking education was for candidature in 
the imperial examination. Those who became educated were thus necessarily 
educated in the chosen doctrines of the imperial state, and literacy and literary 
culture were inextricably linked to the exercise of state control. The vast majority 
of books that stocked a county school library were those that had been published 
in large quantities at the imperial court and distributed across the empire. The 
Ming Emperor Hongwu (1368-1398), for instance, ordered the production of 
numerous didactic texts over the period of his reign, the most famous of which is 
the Six Maxims (liuyu 六谕). These books espoused orthodox Confucian values 
and comprised prescriptions of the knowledge and behavior appropriate to the 
different categories of subjects. The practice was carried on by numerous 
                                                        
4 Timothy Brook, The Chinese State in Ming Society (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 102. 
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emperors after Hongwu, including the Emperor Yongle (1403-1424) whose 
copious issue of didactic texts defined the canon of Confucian classics in the 
interests of the state. Book publishing thus served as a practical means for 
disseminating the imperial state’s definition of knowledge from the center 
outwards, down to the county and even village level.5
 
In addition to such official texts, the imperial state also exerted a large measure of 
influence over the genres of writing that were not overtly related to matters of 
government. Since only the educated could write the novels, plays and poems that 
went on to be disseminated among the people in both written and oral form, the 
texts that eventually came to constitute popular culture were always either 
produced by, or derived from work produced by, members of the 
officially-educated ruling class. Through them, values and beliefs espoused by the 
state became embodied in the legends, myths and stories that circulated amongst 
the masses. This made possible what historian David Johnson has called “a 
hegemony of startling strength and scope.”6 Through its control over education in 
the very media of communication, he remarks, the late imperial state was able to 
achieve “not only cultural integration, but cultural integration based on a 
particular ideology.”7  
 
                                                        
5 Brook, The Chinese State, p. 117. 
6 David Johnson, “Communication, Class, and Consciousness in Late Imperial China,” in Popular Culture in 
Late Imperial China, ed. Johnson et. al. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 47. 
7 Johnson, “Communication,” p. 48. 
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One prominent example of this is found in the popularization of the Qing Emperor 
Kangxi’s (1654-1722) Sacred Edicts (shengyu 圣谕). A didactic text in the 
tradition of Hongwu’s Six Maxims, the Sacred Edicts were translated into dialects 
and vernaculars, explicated, illustrated, dramatized and put to music, so as to 
“facilitate the dissemination of the ideals…among even the lowest levels of 
society.”8 The village lecture system was further set up for it, under which the 
Confucian tenets of the Edict were orated for the benefit of the illiterate at least 
twice a month and in every village, regardless of size.9 Through such ceaseless 
and elaborate efforts, the late imperial state dominated and fully exploited an 
expanding system of literacy and publishing for the communication of its own 
ideological messages. The level of success it achieved leads Johnson to consider 
“One of the leading characteristics of Ming-Qing culture is the extraordinary 
degree to which [state-sanctioned values and beliefs] permeated popular 
consciousness.”10
 
While the state maintained a predominant influence, however, it did not have an 
absolute monopoly over publishing. By the start of the Qing, population growth 
and the expansion of the education system had in fact produced more intellectuals 
than there were places for in the bureaucracy, leaving many educated but 
unemployed scholars to channel their energies into cultural activities such as 
                                                        
8 Victor H. Mair, “Language and Ideology in the Sacred Edict,” in Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, ed. 
Johnson et. al. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 333. 
9 Mair, “Language and Ideology,” pp. 349-357. 
10 Johnson. “Communication,” p. 46. 
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drama and fiction. Some were even drawn into religions such as sectarian 
Buddhism and Taoism, or heterodox sects like the White Lotus society.11 As the 
fictional entertainment productions that such individuals produced rapidly gained 
in popularity, imperial denunciations of their morally corruptive influence had 
little effect. Together with heterodox religious teachings, which were also 
circulated through printed matter and their oration, such writings came to 
constitute an alternative channel of the publishing world that the imperial 
government would never be able to control. The most concerted effort to eliminate 
such undesirable cultural items was the literary inquisition conducted by the Qing 
Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795) from 1772 to 1788, under which more than 2,000 
works were banned and ordered to be destroyed.12 The inquisition in many ways 
served only to underscore the immense difficulty faced by the imperial 
government in this area. Pitched against commercial forces and their 
multitudinous agents spread across the vast expanse of the empire, administrative 
efforts to eliminate the books had only a limited effect. Where there was a demand 
for them, banned books managed to survive and continued to circulate.13
 
The actual political threat to the late imperial state and the ideological deviation 
from its teachings which banned and otherwise discouraged texts represented, 
however, should not be overstated. The virtual equivalence of education with 
                                                        
11 Rawski, “Economic,” pp. 13-14. 
12 Brian Hook ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 213. 
13 Brook, The Chinese State, p. 128. 
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seeking entrance into the civil service ensured that a large measure of state 
influence remained in almost every realm of popular literary culture. In the realm 
of commercial mass entertainment, meanwhile, many of the tales that storytellers 
hawked for profit were vulgarized appropriations from none other than the Sacred 
Edicts.14 Indeed, Confucian values can even be found in the teachings of stridently 
heterodox sects like the White Lotus society – a fact which to Rawski signals “the 
final triumph of imperially sanctioned values.”15  
 
Book publishing in late imperial China was thus not an arena of direct 
confrontation between clearly divided interests of the people against the state. 
Rather, it was defined by waxing and waning but always relatively high levels of 
integration with the imperial state’s interests. Popular literary culture was not that 
which fermented in the cracks below the government’s radar, but rather a realm 
opened up by state-initiated developments in education and entertainment. It was 
identified from the outset as a most formidable tool for inculcating “a wholesome 
culture [in] the masses,”16 and was consequently both wooed and coerced by the 
imperial state. While periods of diversification away from the interests of the 
government did occur, the state remained by far the largest presence in the realm 
of book publishing throughout the late imperial era. 
 
                                                        
14 Mair, “Language and Ideology,” p. 359. 
15 Rawksi, “Economic,” p. 32. 
16 Leo Ou-fan Lee and Andrew J. Nathan, “Beginnings of Mass Culture: Journalism and Fiction in the Late 
Ch’ing and Beyond,” in Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, ed. Johnson et. al. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1985), p. 395. 
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The Republican Interregnum, 1912-1949 
 
Encompassing the founding of the Republic of China (1912), the troubled reign of 
Yuan Shikai (1912-1916), the May Fourth movement (1919), the years of 
Kuomintangs or KMT rule (1927-1937), the war of resistance against Japan 
(1937-1945) and the civil war between the KMT and the CCP (1945-1949), the 
period from 1911 to 1949 was a somewhat exceptional chapter in the history of 
Chinese publishing. In many ways, the political struggle for the nation was waged 
during this period in the mass print media. Disorder in the political sphere was 
mirrored in the publishing industry, both in terms of the content that was printed 
and in terms of changes to the industry’s structure. Unprecedented levels of 
publication were reached, as the mobilization of the masses was increasingly 
sought through the printing and mass distribution of political newspapers and 
periodicals. New presses were opened as others were forcibly closed by whichever 
organization was in power at the time, whose legitimacy was under threat. 
Coercive censorship would only inflame popular sentiment further however and 
provoke greater expressions of dissent. This escalating cycle of political and 
publishing activity was to be repeated several times over the course of the four 
decades.17
 
The battle had begun in the last years of the Qing dynasty, when newspapers 
                                                        
17 Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, Government Control of the Press in Modern China 1900-1949 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 187-192. 
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based in Japan and headed by nationalists such as Sun Yatsen began to call for an 
end to imperial rule. An ailing Qing government under the Empress Dowager Cixi 
attempted to suppress such dissident voices by confiscating copies at their point of 
distribution, shutting down presses and arresting the editors and journalists behind 
them. Rising tides of anti-foreign and anti-Manchu nationalist sentiment could not 
be simply extinguished, however, and political publishing continued through till 
the fall of the empire in 1911. After the Republic of China was established under 
Yuan Shikai in 1912, a similar pattern of publication and suppression occurred as 
anti-Japanese, anti-Western, nationalist and increasingly left-leaning organizations 
and supporters printed newspapers and journals that undermined the legitimacy of 
the Yuan and warlord governments. They were subsequently subject to the same 
means of suppression as the Empress Dowager had employed, though this time by 
Yuan’s police force, other warlords, as well as British and French authorities in 
Shanghai’s foreign concessions. 
 
After the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek established its government in 1927, the 
publications to be suppressed became those of a communist or otherwise left-wing 
bent, which increasingly included socialist novels and theory books as well as 
newspapers and periodicals. The KMT passed publication laws in 1929 and 1930 
that legalized the elimination of politically seditious content as well as punitive 
measures against those responsible for them.18 Hundreds of titles were blacklisted 
                                                        
18 Ting, Government Control, pp. 15-16. 
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and confiscated from the bookstores and post offices where they were being 
distributed. Newspapers were suspended, and writers and editors removed, 
imprisoned and even sentenced to death. The circulation of dissident materials 
continued, however, through communist organizations’ use of guerilla publishing 
tactics such as authorial pseudonyms and circulation by word of mouth. 
 
The KMT’s fight against communism in the realm of publishing ran parallel to the 
its military struggle against the CCP, to which equation the Japanese were added 
after their invasion of China began in 1937. During the war years until 1945, 
publishing became even more starkly a matter of amplifying one’s own political 
position while trying one’s best to muffle the others’. In Japanese occupied cities 
like Shanghai and Nanjing, all newspapers that did not toe the official line of the 
Japanese Domei News Agency and Central News Agency of the puppet 
government under Wang Jingwei were forcibly eliminated.19 In unoccupied China, 
meanwhile, the KMT tightened its control over the mass print media further. 
Under wartime pressure, official newspapers became even more blatantly 
propagandistic, avoiding all reportage on negative developments under the KMT, 
for instance, and referring Chiang Kai-shek as the “Highest Leader” or “Highest 
Authority.”20 The suppression of CCP-leaning publications also intensified apace, 
through escalated newspaper censorship and the stepped-up confiscation and 
burning of blacklisted books.  
                                                        
19 Ibid., p. 130. 
20 Ibid., p. 141. 
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After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the long-drawn struggle between the 
CCP and KMT finally came to a fore. To the methods of press control it had 
previously employed, the KMT now added all means of violent suppression in the 
period of relative lawlessness that ensued. In spite of this, however, both the 
political and publishing efforts of the CCP continued to gain momentum and 
support. Communist newspaper agencies began to publish books as well, and 
developed a network of branch offices across CCP-held areas. The most extensive 
of these was the Xinhua Book Company (Xinhua shudian新华书店), which 
claimed to have 735 branch offices by the time of the CCP’s victory and 
establishment of the PRC in October, 1949.21
 
For the publishing industry, the Republican era was thus a period of disorder 
tending towards violence, but also of unprecedented activity and proliferation 
which lay the foundations for the role of the mass print media in the PRC to date. 
While books had been recognized as a useful means of ideological indoctrination 
in late imperial China, the central use of print media in the struggle for the nation 
cemented its function as a vital tool for modern political control as well. The 
CCP’s effective use of fiction, reportage and other genres of literature as vehicles 
for disseminating political propaganda to the masses was a capability that would 
be further honed during the Mao era that followed. Indeed, several presses and 
bookstores that were established during this period would later become key 
                                                        
21 Ting, p. 163. 
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publishing organs of the CCP government. The two largest publishing houses in 
wartime China, the Commercial Press (Shangwu chubanshe 商务出版社) and 
Zhonghua Book Company (Zhonghua shuju 中华书局), for instance, were once 
mouthpieces of the KMT government but have since been taken over.22 Along 
with the CCP’s Xinhua Book Company, they are now members of the central 
government-administered China Publishing Group (Zhongguo chubanjituan 中国
出版集团). 
 
What makes the Republican era a somewhat exceptional one in the publishing 
history of China, however, is the degree to which the publication and distribution 
of books during this period was decentralized, privately funded and administered, 
and to this extent conducted under the unique conditions of press ‘freedom’ that 
national political instability bordering on chaos tends to afford. Whether it was 
against the Qing imperialists, early Republican warlords, British and French 
colonizers, KMT police or Japanese occupiers, inflammatory and highly 
politicized publishing activities continued despite rampant, lawless and even 
violent censorship. In the years between 1911 and 1949, no single authority was 
able to enforce a system of regulation over publishing activities all across China in 
a manner that was anything more than haphazard, short-term and ultimately 
ineffectual. Publishing was thus a protean medium, through which competing 
ideas could galvanize the masses to political struggle on a national scale. This 
                                                        
22 G. Raymond Nunn, Publishing in Mainland China (Boston, MA: The MIT Press, 1966), p. 14. 
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exceptional form of political press ‘freedom’ would fade as the CCP began to 
strengthen its authority as China’s central government. 
 
The Mao Era, 1949-1978 
 
Establishing control over the new nation’s publishing apparatus was one of the 
first programs that the CCP embarked upon after coming to power on October 1st 
1949. On October 4th, a newly established Ministry of Publicity (xuanchuanbu 宣
传部) turned the Xinhua Book Company from a network of presses into an 
umbrella mega-organization comprising all state-owned facilities for publishing, 
printing and distribution. The organization was to function as the Party’s 
publishing organ and to establish itself as the dominant voice in the nationwide 
book industry. Although the functions of publishing, printing and distribution were 
separated again at the first National Conference on Publications in 1950, the 
central government was to remain the single authority over all three sectors.23 All 
printing would be conducted by the Xinhua Printing House (Xinhua yinshuachang 
新华印刷厂), while the Xinhua Bookstore would be the nation’s main distributor 
and retailer. Publishing in the areas of economics and science would be the done 
by specialized presses such as the Engineering Industry Press (Jixiegongye 
chubanshe机械工业出版社) and Cartographic Press (Ditu chubanshe地图出版
社), while all Party publishing would come under the People’s Publishing House 
                                                        
23 Ibid., p. 14. 
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(Renmin chubanshe人民出版社). The central government would receive all 
income generated and bear all losses incurred.24
 
With this structure for state-owned publishing facilities in place, the central 
government then set to work expanding the scope of state-ownership to 
incorporate all publishing industry facilities in China. Parallel to the 
nationalization of land and heavy industries such as steel and coal, all private book 
publishers, printers and stores were acquired for incorporation into a state-owned 
industry. When this transformation began in 1950, the Xinhua Book Company was 
the only state-owned publisher alongside 6 joint state-private presses and 244 
private presses. In 1954, only 97 private presses remained and by 1957, private 
publishing had been completely eradicated. 25  The number of state-owned 
publishing houses, meanwhile, had increased proportionately, giving the Xinhua 
Book Company an unchallenged monopoly over the industry.26 While this process 
of nationalization was underway, the central government also initiated dramatic 
increases in the volume of publications in all subject fields. Between 1954 and 
1958, the number of titles published increased from 6,516 to 23,333. 27  
Concomitant with government ambitions to rapidly develop the heavy industries 
while also increasing agricultural production, the biggest increases in book 
publishing occurred in the areas of engineering and technology, agriculture and 
                                                        
24 David Wei Ze, “China,” in International Book Publishing: An Encyclopedia, ed. Philip G. Altbach and 
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animal husbandry.28 An almost fourfold increase also occurred within the genre of 
Chinese literature however, as a result of the central government’s effort to use 
popular reading material as a channel for the communication of socialist messages 
and themes. 
 
Indeed, the use of fiction as propaganda is a central feature of state publishing 
policy in the Mao era, which saw state-commissioned socialist and revolutionary 
titles published and distributed by the millions.29 Mao had articulated his belief 
that literature should function exclusively for the socialist education of the 
“workers, peasants, soldiers and popular masses” in his 1942 “Talks at the Yanan 
Forum on Literature and Art” (Yanan wenyi zuotanhui 延安文艺座谈会 )30 
Established under the central government in October 1949, the General 
Administration of Publication (GAP, chubanzongshu 出版总署) became the 
policy-making organ responsible for the nationwide implementation of Mao’s 
conviction. At the first National Publishing Conference, the GAP thus declared the 
fundamental role of publishing was “to serve the people,”31 which meant among 
other things, to “firmly oppose feudalism, capitalism and fascism.”32 In 1954, the 
GAP’s functions were transferred to the Ministry of Culture (wenhuabu 文化部), 
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the Party Committee of which had the same stance on the categorically 
political-economic function of book publishing. Issuing a statement in 1960, the 
Committee declared, “Publishing houses must be in the service of socialism. We 
oppose the idea that we should publish whatever books have been written.”33 
Strict political and administrative dictates issued from the top down and from the 
center out thus provided both the ideological and practical guidelines that all 
publishers were required to adhere to. 
 
State efforts to wield literature as a means of political and intellectual control also 
extended beyond publishers, to reach writers at the individual level. The Chinese 
Writers Association (CWA, Zhongguo zuojia xiehui 中国作家协会 ) was 
established in 1949 as the national organization through which the central 
government effectively turned all writers into employees of the state. 34  
Membership in the CWA became the prerequisite for a writer to publish in any 
literary journal. In addition to managing almost every outlet for literary 
publication, the CWA was also the only organization through which a writer could 
gain state monetary support, or rise to a paid position of administrative or 
ceremonial importance in society. The state thus monopolized the system of 
patronage and hierarchy to which all writers had to belong. In order to excel in 
their fields, writers had to adhere to the ideological principles suggested to them 
by the Ministry of Publicity and produce literary works that the central 
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government could use. The prospect of considerable monetary rewards and career 
advancement also attracted many writers into the CWA and even into the CCP 
itself. Indeed, this was only part of a wider “process of absorbing intellectuals in 
general into state organs,” which saw over two million new recruits between 1949 
and 1952.35 Of these, writers of the May Fourth generation either “disappeared 
into the relative obscurity of universities and museums” as renowned translator 
and writer Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书) did, or remained in the literary circle as 
critics and bureaucrats.36 Mao Dun (矛盾), for example, became the Minister of 
Culture in 1949, while Guo Moruo (郭沫若) occupied a series of official positions 
throughout his career including Director of the Culture and Education Committee 
and President of the Chinese Academy of Science. 
 
The central government’s control over publishing across the entire nation was 
never absolute. Politically subversive poems and stories, for instance, were written 
and privately circulated in an underground literary network that only became more 
widely known after repressive censorship measures began to ease in 1976.37 The 
relationship between intellectuals and the state was also a consistently troubled 
one, as exemplified by the harsh criticisms against the state that intellectuals 
professed when encouraged by the government to speak out during the Hundred 
Flowers movement in 1957. In the subsequent backlash known as the 
Anti-Rightist movements of 1957 and 1959, Mao’s ire at their opinions led to the 
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arrest and removal of over 300,000 people, most of whom were intellectuals. 
Expressing his frustration at their persistent refusal to fall in with the Party line, 
Mao wrote in 1964: 
 
We must drive actors, poets, dramatists and writers out of the cities 
and pack them all off to the countryside… we must not let writers 
stay in the government offices… whoever does not go down [to the 
countryside] will get no dinner; only when they go down will they 
be fed.38
 
Yet despite the turbulent relationship between political and intellectual elite, the 
central government was nevertheless able to achieve an extraordinarily high level 
of dominance over mainstream reading practices during the Mao era. Historian 
Bonnie S. McDougall comments that “What is remarkable about the Chinese 
literary and performing arts establishment (with a few important exceptions) is 
that [they all] remained loyal to the interests of the state and to its rulers.”39 By 
co-opting of the vast majority of the educated population and aggressively 
expanding the nation’s publishing industry along strict Party lines, the state was 
able to ensure that most books in circulation throughout the Mao era were direct 
or indirect vehicles for officially sanctioned political and ideological messages. 
This situation climaxed to a fever pitch during the 1966 to 1976 Cultural 
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Revolution, when few publishing houses remained in business and those that did 
were compelled to produce Mao’s works almost exclusively. So wholly was 
publishing tied to Maoist propaganda that the Publishing Bureau itself was 
replaced in 1967 by the Mao Zedong Works Publishing Office.40 Neither the 
intellectual nor the political elite were spared the arbitrary and often bloody 
persecution that characterized the decade of chaos in which the nation and its 
publishing industry were then engulfed.41
 
Post-Mao China and Marketization: 1980s-present 
 
The end of the Cultural Revolution was closely followed by the 1978 inception of 
Deng Xiaoping’s plans for economic reform. Under new policies aimed at 
constructing of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (juyou zhongguo tese de 
shehuizhuyi 具有中国特色的社会主义) and a healthy and profitable market 
economy, publishing houses began to be weaned off state financial support, as 
subsidies have been gradually withdrawn.42 Whereas the central government had 
fully funded publishers’ fixed assets and management costs in the past, for 
instance, from the early-1980s on the state would only supply but not maintain 
those assets.43 Since they received less funding, publishing houses were required 
to turn less of their profits over to the government and were instead encouraged to 
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allocate a bigger portion of it for reinvestment. Made responsible for their own 
finances in these and other ways, publishing houses were pushed towards 
becoming commercially viable businesses. To further encourage this 
transformation, a monetary bonus was sometimes offered by the state for those 
which successfully met profit targets.44 The result of these reforms at first was the 
rapid opening up of a seller’s market, or what Chinese publishing analyst Sun 
Qingguo has called the “Underserved market period when any book would 
succeed.”45 The dire shortage of reading material that the Cultural Revolution had 
left in its wake all but ensured that any title made available would easily sell in the 
millions. From 1978 to the mid-1980s, therefore, a relatively small number of 
titles were able to generate a tidy income for their publishers.46  
 
As the mechanisms of a market economy began to set in, however, the Chinese 
book market increasingly became a buyer’s market. In order to stand out among 
the growing number of competitors and effectively capture potential buyers’ 
attention, publishing houses began ‘title selling’ – that is, quickly churning out 
new and catchy titles, in the hope of capturing consumer attention by virtue of 
sheer novelty. From the late 1980s to early 1990s, the book market thus saw a 
veritable explosion in the number of titles produced. From 17,000 titles in 1982,47 
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total national title output jumped to 88,000 titles in 199148 and over 90,000 titles 
in 1992.49 As the number of titles on the market increased, however, the average 
number of copies sold per title dropped.50 Under this new book market structure, 
tightening competition among publishing houses for sales eventually translated 
into a battle among titles for shelf-space. No longer able to rely on state financing, 
publishing houses were increasingly compelled to take market forces into serious 
consideration. As economic reform began to cause price increases in other 
industries, including those of raw materials such as paper and ink, the production 
cost of books naturally increased as well. Publishing houses found themselves 
squeezed from both ends, by rising overheads on the production side and falling 
revenues at the sales end. As many began to find it difficult to make ends meet, 
playing to market forces becomes the only way to stay afloat. Competition in a 
commercial retail market thus increasingly became a publishing house’s number 
one priority, absorbing much of its energies and resources. 
 
While it may have made things more difficult for individual publishers however, 
installing a new market economy for books has proven remarkably successful in 
terms of overall industry growth. The number of publishing houses has increased 
from 105 in 1979,51 to 570 in 2005.52 Title output has continued to grow rapidly, 
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totaling 170,000 in 2002,53 and 190,391 in 2003.54 Over the past decade and a half 
in particular, the total value of the market has skyrocketed as a result of modest 
growth in production volume, coupled with dramatic increases in retail prices. The 
total volume of output was 6.67 billion in 2003,55 only slightly higher than its 
6.338 billion figure in 1992.56 Total list price in 2003 however was 56.18 billion 
RMB,57 some five times the 1992 list price total of 11.08 billion RMB (US$1.33 
billion).58 Similarly total market sales increased 10 fold between 1992 and 2002, 
from 4.2 billion RMB (US$506 million) to 43.5 billion RMB (US$5.24 billion).59
 
As the book publishing industry continues to burgeon with astounding rapidity, 
however, qualitative as well as quantitative forms of diversification necessarily 
occur. With more publishers producing a larger number of titles that circulate in 
growing numbers, state control over what the nation is reading inevitably begins 
to erode. Market forces begin to gain against government regulations as a 
publishing house’s operational priority. Trends in the book publishing industry 
thus begin to emerge which can constructively be read as symptoms of a broader 
negotiation between forces of the state and the market. Processes of this 
interaction are still underway and play a central role in defining the character of 
popular reading today.  
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 The Current State of the Market for Books 
 
The book publishing industry in China today is comprised of three main sectors. 
Content editing is the job of publishing houses and accounts for 66% of total 
industry profits; book printing accounts for 26%; and distribution, which is 
conducted by both state-owned and private retailers, accounts for the remaining 
8% of industry profits.60  
Of the three, content editing is the most profitable sector as well as the sector most 
closely monitored by the state. While they may no longer be financially dependent 
on the state, all 563 registered publishing houses in 2005 remain legally 
state-owned. Administratively, this places them under the direct management of 
the central government’s General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP, 
Xinwen chuban zongshu新闻出版总署). 
 
Set up directly under the State Council in January 1987, the GAPP is currently the 
administrative organ responsible for the overall definition and implementation of 
national publishing policy. As described by the Ministry of Culture, the GAPP is 
in charge of determining the principles and policies according to which the 
publishing sector should be run, and enforcing these principles through the 
drafting of corresponding laws and regulations. It is further to supervise and 
                                                        
60 Ibid., p. 6. 
 42
manage all publishing industry activities, from content-editing to printing and 
distribution, and to handle all instances of illegal publishing. In terms of industry 
development, the GAPP is responsible for providing the general direction and plan 
for development, for drafting economic policies and financial regulations for the 
industry, and for setting and controlling production targets.61
 
With such an all-encompassing job description, the precise agenda of the GAPP 
and the degree of success with which it implements this are impossible to measure 
definitively. One of the means by which the GAPP does wield an obvious and 
considerable measure of influence however is through its authority to issue and 
rescind the licenses of all legal publishing houses. For publishers, being in accord 
with the GAPP could thus mean entry into the market, while going up against it 
could quickly entail being shut down. Another tool at the GAPP’s disposal is 
ISBN numbers, which the government requires all books to have in order to be 
printed, and which the GAPP alone has the authority to issue. Through these 
mechanisms for withholding the legal means to publish, the state is able to achieve 
a measure of “censorship through management.”62 The GAPP “prevents deviation. 
(Strictly speaking, there is no censorship).”63  
As commercial forces continue to rapidly gather momentum, however, a strong 
sense is growing within the industry that both publishers and state policies must 
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either adapt and evolve more quickly or soon face obsolescence. Indeed, many of 
the existing administrative controls have already proven unsatisfactory. It is 
common knowledge, for instance, that a lucrative trade has opened up in which 
state-owned publishers sell ISBN numbers to illegal private publishers, who then 
publish and distribute their own books under the state-owned publisher’s name. 
Since state-owned companies have ready access to GAPP-issued ISBN numbers 
but are hard pressed for income, while private publishers have highly marketable 
titles but no legal way to publish them, both sides stand to benefit from the 
exchange. The prices of ISBN numbers range from RMB10,000 (US$ 1,200) to 
RMB50,000 (US$6,000), depending on the state-owned publisher’s reputation, 
and the volume of sales anticipated. 64  Such developments are not only 
embarrassing for the government, but also represent an economically inefficient 
allocation of resources and create illegal markets that are beyond the reach of state 
control. For the economic health of the industry, and so as to ensure that it remains 
a relevant and credible regulatory authority, the state is thus in active pursuit of 
continuing reforms to further liberalize the industry legally. 
 
One measure that has been taken to restructure the industry is the establishment in 
2000 of ‘publishing groups’ (chubanjituan 出版集团). These are conglomerates 
that bring several publishers, printers and distributors together into a single 
organization, separate from both central and provincial government publication 
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bureaus. Bringing multiple units and sectors together is expected to make 
publishers more commercially competitive, particularly as international 
competition starts to become a factor of consideration. Publishing groups are 
meant to facilitate the pooling of material resources, management reform 
including personnel restructuring, raising the quality of publications,65 and the 
improvement of sales through branding and other marketing strategies.66 The 
reorganization is meant to establish a clear line of distinction between publishing 
business management and the administrative functions of the government, which 
is to be seen as a lawful regulator of the industry rather than as an insidious 
participant.67  
 
Since 2000, more than 20 book publishing groups have been created,68 the biggest 
of which is the China Publishing Group, established in April 2002. A national 
conglomerate giant, the CPG incorporates industry heavyweights such as the 
People’s Press (Renmin chubanshe人民出版社 ), People’s Literature Press 
(Renmin wenxue chubanshe人民文学出版社), Commercial Press, Zhonghua 
Book Corporation, SDX Book Company (Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian
生活读书新知三联书店 ), China Translation and Publishing Corporation 
(Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chubanshe gongsi中国对外翻译出版公司), the Xinhua 
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Book Company and China National Publications Import and Export Corporation 
(Zhongguo tushu jinchukou zonggongsi中国图书进出口总公司). Within one year 
of its founding, the CPG’s turnover is reported to have increased 27%, to 3.3 
billion RMB in 2003.69 The organization is administered by the GAPP, the 
Ministry of Publicity and the Ministry of Finance. Its President, Yang Muzhi, is 
also a former deputy director of the GAPP. The CPG is thus both the realization of 
a newly liberalized and financially driven industry structure, as well as a 
formidable expression of state power within this structure. Although the 
establishment of publishing groups is meant to draw clearer demarcations between 
publishing business management and the government bureaucracy, the close 
administrative relationship between publishing groups and government ministries, 
as well as the strategic appointment of key personnel ensure that in actual practice 
these lines remain blurred.  
 
A second major step towards market liberalization and reform has been the 
changing of many publishing houses’ government-designated administrative status 
from that of public institution (shiye事业) to that of state-owned enterprise (qiye
企业). An institution is a non-profit unit, expected to operate with the public good 
(gongyi公益) as its top priority. An enterprise, on the other hand, is a commercial 
unit allowed to operate along profit-motivated business principles, and expected to 
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manage its finances and assets independently (zizhu jingying自主经营).70 In early 
March 2004, the central government authorized all publishers except the People’s 
Press to become enterprises over the next three to seven years.71 This not only 
allows them to work towards greater commercial viability, but also creates the 
potential for legal collaboration with private publishers, to produce officially 
recognized yet highly marketable publications.72 The China Publishing Group was 
the first publishing group to be transformed into an enterprise, and was renamed 
the China Publishing Corporation (Zhongguo chubanjituan gongsi 中国出版集团
公司) in March 2004.  
 
The sector in which market liberalization has proceeded most quickly and to the 
greatest degree, however, is that of distribution. Long monopolized by the Xinhua 
Bookstore, the retail market for books was opened to private companies in 1982.73 
Since the mid-1990s in particular, the number of private retailers has rapidly 
increased as business thrives.74 By the end of 2003, the number of privately 
owned book companies totaled 78,000 – approximately double the number of 
state-owned companies.75 By 2005, the ratio of private to state-owned bookstores 
was approximately 4:1. There were 30 private distribution companies valued at 
more than 100 million RMB, and about 80,000 online distributors – more than 
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five times the number of Xinhua Bookstore outlets.76 Although state-owned 
distributors still accounted for 76.7% of total distribution in 2002, almost half of 
this comes from the mandatory, state-conducted distribution of textbooks. 
Neglecting this segment of the market, privately owned companies account for 
slightly more than half of both the national distribution capacity, as well as the 
total value of book sales.77 Commonly referred to as the “second channel” (di er 
qudao第二渠道 ), in subordination to the primary channel of state-owned 
distributors, the private distribution and retail system has thus become a central 
feature of the book market. Adapting to this reality, the central government has 
started to pay more attention to, and express official support for private companies, 
thereby legitimizing them and increasing their political and social standing.78 
Increasingly, publishing policy outlines and industry journals feature calls to 
eliminate the term “second channel” altogether, so as to place the private sector on 
equal footing with state-owned organizations. 
 
Becoming more entrenched by the day, the current consumer book industry is thus 
an arena of popular consumption in which the state and the market are intensely 
engaged with each other. Long recognized as a potent tool for ideological 
indoctrination and historically guarded as a province of state domination, the book 
industry today is one in which the regulatory authority of the state continues to 
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wield a large measure of administrative and economic influence. As the market 
economy develops, however, commercial forces generate their own initiatives and 
momentum. Decisions are increasingly based more on financial considerations 
than on the ideological prescriptions of the official line.79 Indeed, the state itself 
contributes to this shift through its activities as a financially savvy and highly 
competitive producer in the market. As market forces are constantly working their 
way around and over state regulations, the state is thus continuously adapting to 
market forces. Developments in the current book publishing industry can therefore 
be seen as symptoms of the state and market in negotiation, both cooperating with 
and competing against each other. One outgrowth of these interactive dynamics 
that this study will proceed to discuss is the emergence of the ‘bestseller’ 
(changxiaoshu 畅销书) as a preferred genre of literature. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE RISE OF THE BESTSELLER 
 
The Bestseller Phenomenon 
 
In the post-1978 market economy system, publishers’ increasing dependence on 
sales income has led to a general rethinking of the nature of the book business. 
Industry journals and reports reflect a growing sense of books as consumer 
entertainment products, rather than as bearers of high culture or spiritual 
edification. This is a result of the publishing industry’s new financial structure, 
which no longer treats books as special items whose exceptional value warrants 
external subsidization from the state. Rather, books are treated as ordinary 
commodities whose production must be justified and financed by their own 
market value. As one established publishing journal observes, “good books are no 
longer written but rather are ‘made’ (zuo chulai de做出来的). Books may be 
cultural products but they are also an industry like any other.” While a good book 
should have a beneficial effect on society, it must also be commercially viable, or 
able to ‘earn its keep.’1 In selecting and editing content, publishers must thus aim 
to strike the balance between high (gaoya高雅) and low (disu低俗) culture that is 
best able to capture the market.2
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 As mentioned in the previous chapter, publishers’ efforts to achieve this from the 
mid-1980s to early 1990s took the form of ‘title selling,’ or satiating consumer 
demand with an overabundance of throw-away titles. From the mid-1990s to the 
present however, bestselling books (changxiao shu畅销书) appear to be the 
marketing strategy of choice. This is because tightening competition for sales 
income puts pressure on publishers to maximize returns to capital, and one of the 
most efficient ways to do so is to switch from selling a few items of many 
different products, to selling many items of a single one. Assuming the total 
number of copies sold is the same, the production cost of one title is far lower than 
the production cost of many titles. There is only one manuscript fee to pay, 
printing requires only one type set and government publishing tax, which is levied 
on a per title rather than per copy basis, is minimized. The potential gains from 
switching to this mode of production are particularly high in the book publishing 
industry, for while others such as the computer or car industry comprise only a 
handful of different products, the 2004 book market comprised over 20,000 
different titles, of which 13,000 were new.3 As increasing production costs and 
evasive demand squeeze publishers on both ends, running many prints of a single 
title seems to be the only way to profit.4
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On the consumer side, a growing perception among readers of books as 
entertainment products “for one time use only” has also led to consumption 
patterns that are geared towards bestsellers. 5  Seen as sources of instant 
gratification rather than as intellectual fodder for a protracted period of digestion, 
books are now cultural products with short life-spans. Demand for individual titles 
is subject to the capricious rise and fall of crazes and trends.6 Such consumer 
behavior makes it not only possible, but indeed very advisable, for publishers to 
cash in while they can by selling as many copies of a title as they can within a 
short period of time. Moving fast and at minimized production costs, bestsellers’ 
high profit potentials make them an appealing option to publishers.7 Both a 
producer and consumer trend then, the bestseller phenomenon now sees 10-20% 
of the titles produced in a given year accounting for approximately 80% of that 
year’s book sales.8  
 
As bestsellers grew to be a permanent feature of the book market, bestseller charts 
(tushu xiaoshou paihangbang图书销售排行榜) identifying and ranking them 
began to appear in 1995. These charts have quickly gained a prominent place in 
the media and become a standard reference for readers, publishers, importers and 
researchers.9 Many are merely an alternate form of advertising and cannot be 
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trusted. The more comprehensive and reputable charts, some of which are cited in 
this study, are the China Cities Book Sales Chart (Zhongguo chengshi tushu 
xiaoshou paihangbang中国城市图书销售排行榜) and the The Beijing News 
(Xinjingbao新京报) book sales chart, both of which combine sales statistics from 
all the major bookstores in several cities; the rating charts in publishing journals 
such as the China Publishing Report (Zhongguo tushu shangbao中国图书商报), 
Wide View on Publishing (Chuban guangjiao出版广角 ), and Science and 
Publishing (Keji yu chuban科技与出版); and rating charts from online bookstores 
like Sinja.com (Xinlangwang dushu pindao新浪网读书频道), and Dangdang.com 
(Dangdang wang当当网). 
 
Bestsellers as a Nexus of the State, the Market and the People 
 
In order for a bestseller to become, the forces of the state, the market and the 
people must all have been at work. Without at least the tacit support of the state, 
for one, a new book title may become a runaway hit in the private newsstands and 
bookshops of the ‘second channel,’ but would not become a chart-topper among 
the far larger, state-owned bookstores. A measure of state sanction must thus lie 
behind the narratives and messages that are advocated in any bestseller title. 
Secondly, since a bestseller is defined by its sales performance, the distributive 
forces of marketing and profitability must also be in place for the successful 
making of a bestselling narrative. Finally, the preferences and desires of the 
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people are reflected by consumer demand for titles, as well as through the voices 
of their authors. A closer examination of the agendas and agents of each of these 
three factors will shed light on the tensions and interactions that bind them in their 
co-production of the nation’s popular reading materials. 
 
The agendas of the state are defined by the CCP government and broadly consist 
of promoting social stability, economic development, and the political authority of 
the ruling party government. Whereas book publishing was a direct and 
uncontested channel for the dissemination of state propaganda during the Mao era, 
its post-1978 transformation into a commercial entertainment industry has 
introduced new threats to state control over the medium. Since economic 
development is also a key national agenda, however, the state is saddled with the 
twin conflicting objectives of stronger political control on the one hand and higher 
economic returns on the other. It is thus torn in its policy-making between treating 
book publishing as a form of socio-political indoctrination to be controlled and 
supported at the state’s expense, and treating it as an ordinary commodity industry 
of which to demand optimum performance for profit maximization. While the 
state is eager to see highly marketable content being generated, it is also wary of 
the volatile forces of commercial success and their potential to develop into social 
or political threats. 
 
The state exercises its influence over publishing content firstly through the various 
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policies discussed in the previous chapter. Through the administrative organ of the 
GAPP, the state has the managerial authority to directly decide what does and does 
not get published and to penalize any deviation from this official line. To the 
extent that publishers must remain at least loosely on the state’s good side in order 
to stay in business, this mechanism is basically effective. In addition, the GAPP’s 
hard regulations are also padded with softer forms of persuasion. Messages from 
ministries and officials, for example, encourage a more conservative publishing 
philosophy. They promote the traditional notion of literature as a means of moral 
edification10 and call for greater editorial restraint to be exercised in the pursuit of 
marketability. These messages are picked up and have become a staple rhetoric in 
public domains such as publishing industry journals, academic papers and 
newspapers’ culture and lifestyle sections. 
 
The state’s second avenue of influence is its direct participation in cultural 
production and sales. Several major presses remain very close to the central 
government and continue to serve as the state’s publishing organs. As discussed 
earlier, the People’s Press was the first national press that the CCP government set 
up after the founding of the PRC and has remained a press that “both the Party and 
the people’s government embrace and think highly of” ever since.11 Similarly, the 
People’s Literature Press has been a national level (guojiaji国家级 ) press 
specializing in literature since it was established by the central government in 
                                                        
10 Wei, “China,” p. 452. 
11 “About Us.” <www.peoplepress.net/aboutus/lsjz.asp>. 
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1951. Its stated corporate mission is to “improve the literature publishing industry 
and strengthen the cultural development of the nation.”12 Both presses have been 
and continue to be heavyweight fixtures in the book publishing industry. In 55 
years, the People’s Press has published over 10,000 titles and 200 million copies, 
and the People’s Literature Press over 8,000 titles and 70 million copies. Both are 
now key members of the central government’s China Publishing Group and are 
widely seen as well-established (gao dangci高档次) presses that can be relied 
upon for edifying, high-quality publications. 
 
Indeed, the CCP itself also maintains several of its own large-scale publishing 
operations. The CCP Party History Press (Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe中央党
史出版社), CCP Central Party School Press (Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao 
chubanshe 中共中央党校出版社), and Central Literature Press (Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe中央文献出版社) are the main party mouthpieces responsible 
for articulating the official line. They publish works on Marxism and Leninism, 
Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory as well as on the Party’s history, 
directions and policies, and writings by and about other Party leaders and thinkers. 
The China Youth Press (Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe中国青年出版社) is the 
publishing organ of the Communist Youth League of China (Zhongguo 
gongqingtuan中国共青团). It targets a younger audience and publishes books 
from a broad range of genres including people (renwu 人物), growing up 
                                                        
12 Ibid. 
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(chengzhang 成长 ), feelings (qinggan 情感 ), trendy-ness (shishang 时尚 ), 
perspectives (shijiao视角), youth literature (qingnian wenxue青年文学), as well 
as art, music, information technology and fiction. 
 
If the commercialization of the book industry threatens the position of ideology, 
these presses represent the state’s effort to respond. By re-packaging ideological 
content into more commercially attractive forms, the state commodifies its own 
messages and sends them out to compete for an audience in the culture and 
entertainment free marketplace.13 While the Party History Press and Party School 
Press remain primarily for Party members and others with a specific interest in the 
CCP, the Central Literature Press and China Youth Press have a wider reader base. 
Their publications are designed for broad appeal to popular tastes and have been 
very commercially successful. The China Youth Press in particular has achieved a 
strong presence on retail bookshelves through genres such as youth fiction and 
celebrity biographies, as well as through its numerous lifestyle and entertainment 
magazines. Its publications have had considerable success on the best-seller charts, 
and include one of the case-studies of this paper, Hongdijinzi: liuqishi niandai de 
Beijing haizi (Gold Letters on a Red Base: Beijing Children of the Sixties and 
Seventies红底金字：六七十年代的北京孩子). The state itself is thus a formidable 
competitor in the best-seller market. 
 
                                                        
13 Wei, “China,” p. 448. 
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The agendas of the market, meanwhile, are primarily profit-oriented. In the 
consumer entertainment marketplace, commercial forces put pressure on 
producers to pursue profit-maximizing strategies. Having the support of the state 
can facilitate this pursuit by providing readier access to promotional activities in 
major bookstores and favorable reviews in mainstream newspapers. For these 
purposes, the market can and does adopt the agendas of the state. Running counter 
to state agendas, however, can also be a lucrative business, as in the case of 
inflammatory or risqué narratives and pornography. In these instances, the market 
can also circumvent state interests in its pursuit of pure profit. Its agents are then 
the commercially oriented presses and all the individual employees whose 
livelihoods are dependent on the commercial success of their books. This includes 
the employees of state-run and party-run presses and distributors. Under new 
operational structures, publishing industry employees now enjoy greater 
autonomy in day to day decision-making than before, but are also under immense 
pressure to produce profits.14 With their income tied to the sales performance of 
their books, for example, editors are encouraged to select and edit for mass 
marketability.15 Broad and instant audience appeal is thus increasingly prioritized 
above literary standards and educational value. Indeed, according to one industry 
analyst, employees responsible for a press’s finance and business management 
have begun to outstrip editorial staff in terms of overall influence and rank.16  
                                                        
14 Ibid., p. 459; See also Shuyu Kong, Consuming Literature: Best Sellers and the Commercialization of 
Literary Production in Contemporary China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 41. 
15 Kong, Consuming Literature, p. 41. 
16 Wei, “China,” p. 450. 
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 Through these operational changes and priorities, publishing houses have thus 
begun to act as agents of the market. Among those that are doing this most 
successfully are China Citic Press (Zhongxin chubanshe中信出版社) and the 
Changjiang Literature and Arts Press (Changjiang wenyi chubanshe长江文艺出
版社). China Citic Press was established under the China Citic Group in 1988 as 
the nation’s first publishing enterprise (qiyehua chubanjigou企业化出版机构). 
An initiative undertaken to realize Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform goals, it has 
been commercially oriented from its inception. It publishes in genres for which 
there is currently the highest popular interest, such as celebrity biographies, pop 
finance and self-help books. Among its most successful productions are two of the 
top ten bestselling books for all of 2000 to 2005 – the Chinese translations of 
corporate American motivational manual Who Moved My Cheese which sold over 
550,000 copies, and of wealth-improvement guide Rich Dad, Poor Dad which 
sold over 233,000.17 The Changjiang Literature and Arts Press meanwhile, was 
started in 1955 but has been highly successful at making the transition into a 
commercialized book market. Since it made producing bestsellers a primary goal 
in 2004, it has put out works by and about popular contemporary cultural figures 
and novelists and achieved considerable market success as a result. 18  Its 
achievements include the hugely successful novel Langtuteng (The Wolf Totem狼
                                                        
17 Zhou Baiyi 周百义, “Zhongguo changxiaoshu shichang zhuangkuang de diaocha yu fenxi” 中国畅销书
市 场 状 况 的 调 查 与 分 析  (Survey and Analysis of China’s Bestseller Market), 
<www.pubhistory.com/img/text/1/1231.htm>. 
18 “About Us,” <http://www.cjlap.com/bjcolumn/aboutus.asp>. Date accessed: 1 June 2006. 
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图腾), which sold over 137,000 copies and whose English translation book rights 
were purchased by Penguin Publishers for US$100,000.19 Tailoring their products 
for easy mass appeal and strategically publishing within highly marketable genres, 
both presses have acquired a rapidly growing presence on bookstore shelves. They 
now regularly churn out bestselling titles, including two case-studies of this paper, 
Lianxiang fengyun (The Legend of Lenovo联想风云) and Wode shijie wode meng 
(My World, My Dreams我的世界我的梦). 
 
Also included as agents of the market are those authors whose primary goal is to 
increase their own market value. Since the mid-1980s, economic reforms have 
pushed not only publishers but also writers out from the security of guaranteed 
state-funding and into a competitive cultural marketplace. Whereas writers during 
the Mao era enjoyed lifetime contracts with the Writer’s Association as ‘tenured 
writers’ (zhongshenzhi zuojia 终身制作家), in the present they can hope only to 
become short term ‘contract writers’ (qianyue zuojia 签约作家) at best.20 Indeed, 
with the meager manuscript fees that the Writer’s Association now offers on the 
one hand and the vast profit potential of the commercial book market on the other, 
many writers now see direct freelance arrangements with publishers as by far the 
more desirable option. Royalty-based contracts, first introduced in the late 1980s 
and exploited with astounding success in 1992 by celebrity writer Wang Shuo (王
                                                        
19  Zhou, “Zhongguo changxiaoshu”; See also “English Version Set for ‘The Wolf Totem’ Novel,” 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/05/content_475097.htm>. Date accessed: 1 June 2006. 
20 Kong, Consuming Literature, p. 14. 
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朔), reward writers based on the sales performance of their books.21 Inspired by 
this precedent and recognizing the market as the only viable path to financial 
success, writers are now more inclined to go into business themselves (xiahai 下
海).22 A close relationship between writer and publisher, based on high first print 
runs and sales-based royalties, has since been recognized as the publishing 
business model of the future. The prospect of entry into the swelling ranks of the 
“millionaire writers”23 who look set to dominate the future book market motivates 
many to channel their efforts into writing the next hit title and making it as a 
celebrity writer.24  
 
Even if it is not an author’s only interest, the commercial viability of a manuscript 
is no longer a factor that any can afford to ignore. Writing about his motives for 
producing Hongdijinzi, a book on 1960s and 1970s Beijing that is used in this 
study, editor Lin Dong (林栋) highlights the “immeasurable profit potential of 
nostalgia”25 as a primary factor. He writes: 
 
For an editor, it is only when salespeople are constantly hurrying 
you for reprint after reprint and when your book is welcomed by 
                                                        
21 Ibid., pp. 25-26. Wang Shuo’s over 20 bestselling novels, including Wande jiushi xintiao (玩的就是心跳 
Playing for Thrills), Guobayin jiusi (过把瘾就死 Live it up and Die), and Qianwan bei bawo dangren (千万
别把我当人 Please Don’t Call Me Human) given him over 10 million copies in print and have made him a  
multi-millionaire.  
22 Ibid., p. 22. 
23 Ibid., p. 32. 
24 Ibid., p. 14. See also Wei, “China,” p. 453. 
25 Lin Dong 林栋, “Ba ‘huaijiu’ zuocheng xingfendian” 把‘怀旧’做成兴奋点 (Making Nostalgia a Point of 
Excitement), Changxiaoshu beihou 畅 销 书 背 后  (Behind the Bestseller), 
<www.chinapostnews.com.cn/760/07600502.htm>. 
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readers, when it achieves both social effect and economic returns – 
it is only then that an editor can enjoy the great happiness that 
success in this industry can bring. 
 
Through the self-interest of the institutions and individuals involved, the market 
thus plays a central role in shaping bestsellers and the narratives that they carry. 
 
Finally, the third factor in the making of a bestseller is the people. As the source of 
demand in a book market, the people express their preferences through consumer 
behavior. Books that appeal strongly to the people sell in the hundreds of 
thousands and become runaway bestsellers, while those that achieve only 
moderate sales and a marginal presence on the shelves and in the media. Also to 
be included in the category of the people are the writers and editors who produce 
these books. Although subject to the various restrictions imposed by state and 
market, these individuals do retain a measure of expressive autonomy within 
which to articulate opinions, both for themselves and on behalf of a larger, 
non-writing collective. The people are thus at both ends of the making of a 
bestseller: they are the individuals who write, edit and review the books, as well as 
the collective that purchases them in large enough quantity to warrant the 
bestseller appellation. In some ways, the people then seem like the single most 
important factor in determining the success or failure of a book. Yet the opinions, 
preferences and actions of the people are also heavily targeted and influenced by 
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forces of the state and the market. All three factors are thus inseparably entwined 
in the bestseller industry, whose products must thus be seen as nexuses of the state, 
the market and the people. 
 
Biographies and Memoirs in the Bestseller Industry 
 
Traditionally a staple genre of literature in Chinese intellectual history, the 
biography (zhuanji 传记) was heavily used during the Mao era as a vehicle for 
the popular promulgation of political and ideological messages. The state-run 
publishing organs and Writers’ Association were prolific in churning out 
biographies that were predominantly of a narrow political focus – idealized 
portraits of revolutionary heroes and deifications of Chairman Mao. During the 
Cultural Revolution, this trend came to a fore and biographies that were not 
ideologically propagandistic virtually ceased to exist.26 The end of the Cultural 
Revolution and subsequent broadening of cultural and intellectual spheres then 
saw a diversification of biographical literature, both in terms of subject and 
approach. Biographies were now written not only of political leaders, but also of 
people from various other walks of life. They portrayed their subjects from 
broader social and cultural, rather than narrowly political, perspectives. Through 
the narratives of their subjects lives, they also engaged wider issues in Chinese 
                                                        
26 Zhu Wenhua朱文华, Zhuanji tonglun传记通论 (Comprehensive Discussion on Biography) (Shanghai: 




Since the early-1980s, marketization of the book publishing industry has further 
accelerated this trend. Particularly since the 1990s, the gathering momentum of 
commercialization in the industry has seen a great diversification and rapid 
proliferation of biographical literature.28 Biographies now run the gamut from 
dynastic emperors, successful business people, writers and academics, to Olympic 
athletes, actors, singers and television talk show hosts. Memoirs about these icons 
written by their spouses, parents, children, grandchildren, cousins and friends also 
abound. Known as ‘celebrity publishing’ (mingxing chuban 明星出版), these 
books have become one of the most popular genres of literature in the market.29 
Publications sell as well as close to one million copies in less than six months, 
seemingly regardless of their literary quality.30 In addition, biographies and 
memoirs are also produced of individuals who are not famous, but claim to 
represent the ordinary experience of larger collectives such as their generation, 
province or historical milieu. Every month a fresh handful of new titles appear on 
bookstore shelves and without fail occupy several places on any bestseller chart. 
Charts are even available that rank new biographies and memoirs exclusively, 
such as People Magazine’s (Renwu zhoukan) New Biographies Bestseller Chart. 
 
                                                        
27 Ibid., pp. 141-143. 
28 Chen Lancun 陈兰村, Zhongguo zhuanji wenxue fazhanshi 中国传记文学发展史 (The Developmental 
History of Chinese Biographical Literature), (Beijing: Yuyan chubanshe 语言出版社, 1999), pp. 487-488. 
29 Sun, “Economics,” p. 126. See also Kong, Consuming Literature, p. 50. 
30 Kong, Consuming Literature, p. 50. 
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Several explanations for the overwhelming popularity of biographies have been 
put forward by publishing journals and biographical theory research (zhuanji lilun 
yanjiu 传记理论研究) studies.31 Compared to fiction, biographies are considered 
more educational and informative because they are based on facts.32 Historian 
Geremie Barmé includes biographies and memoirs in the genre of popular 
Chinese readings he calls “faction [factual fiction].”33 Through the stories of 
individual lives, they are thought to offer insight into broader fields or areas of 
current interest such as US politics or world soccer.34 They also appeal to what are 
considered fundamental aspects of human nature – “natural curiosity and 
voyeurism,”35 human empathy (ziwo rentong自我认同), nostalgia or historical 
lament (lishi cansanggan历史沧伤感) and the need for role models (chongshang 
quanwei de yishi崇尚权威的意识).36 People who have risen to prominent 
positions or achieved great success in their fields, for example, guide the way for 
others through their biographies as their words and actions are considered a source 
of inspiration and psychological support.37
 
Biographies and memoirs are also thought to be well received because they meet a 
natural human need for a sense of history. According to this theory, as creatures 
that accord great importance to their own history, people will always relish the 
                                                        
31 Zhu, Zhuanji, pp. 144-145. 
32 Chen, Zhongguo zhuanji, p. 486. 
33 Geremie Barmé, “History for the Masses,” in Using the Past to Serve the Present, ed. Jonathan Unger (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), p. 270. 
34 Zhu, Zhuanji, pp. 54-55. 
35 Barmé, “History for the Masses,” p. 271. 
36 Sun Jing 孙晶, “Tushu liuxing de xuanti duice” “图书流行的选题对策” (Topic Selection Strategies for 
Trendy Books) in Chuban guangjiao出版广角 (Wide View on Publishing), August 2005, pp. 58-59. 
37 Ibid. 
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narration of their individual and collective pasts. A conception of the formative 
past is a natural instinct and an essential ingredient in the process of 
self-identification.38 Although they include aesthetic elements and a measure of 
poetic license, biographies are nevertheless a subgenre of history. While their 
forms of expression may be heavily influenced by fictional literature, their content 
remains factual and is gathered according to the same principles of truth and 
accuracy along which history is written.39 Biographies do, however, offer a greater 
allowance for creative illustration and logical imagination than history writing 
permits. They thus serve as an enriching supplement to history, presenting 
knowledge of the past in a richer, more tangible and detailed way. Because of this 
ability to meet the fundamental human need for a past, biographical literature has 
been and will continue to be popular.40
 
This understanding of the function of biographies and memoirs is also reflected in 
newspaper and journal reviews of newly released titles. In reviews of Lianxiang 
fengyun and interviews with its author Ling Zhijun (凌志军), for example, Ling is 
said to have approached the project from the perspective of “Chinese culture and 
historical narration, so as to write his subject’s story as history.”41 Similarly, a 
review of two autobiographies in the Beijing Evening News (Beijing wanbao北京
晚报) locates their worth in entering their authors’ experiences into the record of 
                                                        
38 Sun, “Tushu liuxing,” p. 58. 
39 Zhu, Zhuanji, pp. 13-15. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Lei Tian雷天, “‘Wo bushi renheren de qiangshou’ – Ling Zhijun fangtanlu” ‘我不是任何人的枪手’ - 陵志
军访谈录 (I am Nobody’s Mouthpiece – an Interview with Ling Zhijun), in Zhongguo xinshu中国新书 
(New China Books) Vol. 2, p. 15.
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history,42 while a review of four new biographies in the journal Publishers 
(Chubanren出版人) expresses gratitude that their authors have salvaged their 
histories from dissipating into mere myth. 43  The reviewer emphasizes the 
importance of individual people’s histories “because it is through them that one 
can comprehend national historical events in relation to the individual.” He 
commends one book entitled Experience (Jingli经历 ) in particular, for 
representing a “collective Chinese history” by recording the various backgrounds 
and personalities of many individuals, and for vividly describing many aspects of 
their shared experience, such as manual labor, hunger and canteens.44  
 
More specifically then, biographies and memoirs’ ability to tell stories about 
China and Chinese people seems to be an important source of their strong appeal 
in the domestic market. Among the standard approaches to making a bestseller, 
not only focusing on celebrities but also identifying and promoting China’s own 
characteristics (Zhongguo bentuse中国本土色) is seen as a highly effective 
strategy.45 Several translated biographies of foreign icons have performed well in 
the Chinese market, such as those of Bill Clinton, Jack Welch and Sam Walton. By 
far the vast majority of bestsellers, however, are those of Chinese nationals and 
are specifically marketed as such. Successful business people and athletes are 
                                                        
42 Sun Xiaoning孙小宁, “Lianggeren de jiyi, ling yizhong meishushi” 两个人的记忆，另一种美术史 (Two 
People’s Memories – A Different Kind of Art History), in Beijing wanbao 北京晚报 (Beijing Evening News), 
March 28, 2005, p. 22. 
43 Liu Suli刘苏里, “Gerenshi daodi you duoda zhangli?” 个人史到底有多大张力? (Just How Useful are 
Individual Histories?), in Chubanren 出版人 (Publishers), 2005 Vol. 16, pp. 44-45. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hai Mo, “Haoshu,” p. 16. 
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promoted through their achievements for China, for instance, while imperial and 




This study uses as representative texts six biographies and memoirs that achieved 
high sales records and a prominent presence on city-based bestseller charts 
between 2003 and 2005. These are the biographies of basketball superstar Yao 
Ming (姚明), CEO of Lenovo computer company Liu Chuanzhi (柳传志), and 
former President of China Jiang Zemin (江泽民); and the memoirs of translator 
and writer Yang Jiang (杨绛), celebrated writer Wang Meng (王蒙), and ordinary 
child of sixties and seventies Beijing, Liu Yangdong (刘仰东).  
 
Yao Ming’s (b. 1980) biography Wode shijie wode meng (My World, My Dreams
我的世界我的梦) was co-written with ESPN’s anchor NBA journalist Ric Bucher 
and first published in English by Miramax in September 2004. Several major 
Chinese presses competed vigorously for publishing rights to the Chinese 
translation. Renowned for their bestseller industry savvy, the Changjiang 
Literature and Arts Press team won the bid at a hefty 1.5 million US dollars.46 The 
book was launched in October 2004, in conjunction with display matches between 
the Houston Rockets and Sacramento Kings in Beijing and Shanghai. Released 
                                                        
46 “Yaoming zizhuan jintian shangshi” 姚明自传今天上市 (Yao Ming’s Biography Hits Markets Today), in 
Beijing wanbao 北京晚报 (Beijing Evening News), 14 October 2004, p. 25.  
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with a first print run of 100,000 copies, it immediately appeared and stayed for 
two months on the China Cities Book Sales Chart, a weekly-updated compilation 
of reported sales from major bookstores in Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Guangzhou, Fujian, Gansu, Kunming and Shenyang. Within a month, it also 
became the number one title on The Beijing Times bestseller chart, which tabulates 
sales statistics from six major Beijing bookshops and three online bookstores.47
 
Yao’s biography tells the story of his rise from being the awkwardly tall kid on his 
high-school basketball team in China, to being a star player for the NBA’s 
Houston Rockets. Written in simple language and comprised mostly of personal 
comments and anecdotes, Yao’s biography focuses on material conditions in the 
various chapters of his life. Incorporating quotes from his parents, coaches, friends, 
managers and teammates, the book is said to construct a well-rounded picture by 
incorporating multiple perspectives. It is also marketed as the story of a Chinese 
person who has “successfully crossed the gaping cultural chasm between China 
and America,” and is now “living the ‘American dream.’” Co-author Ric Bucher 
calls Yao’s story “proof that the ancient civilization of China can not only enter 
the global arena of competition, but can even achieve remarkable results in it.” 
Chinese reviewers meanwhile are won over by Yao’s “fervent patriotism” 
(quanquande aiguozhixin拳拳的爱国之心), which together with his outstanding 
                                                        
47 Namely Beijing Book Building北京图书大厦, Wangfujing Bookstore王府井书店, Sanlian taofen Book 
Center三联韬奋图书中心, Zhongguancun Book Building中关村图书大厦, Fengrusong Bookstore风入松书
店, Guolinfeng Bookstore国林风书店, Shengqi Online Bookstore旌旗网上书店, Zhuoyue Online Bookstore
卓越网上书店, and Hongnibacun Online Children’s Bookstore红泥巴村网上儿童书店. 
 69
basketball skills makes him a worthy representative of China.48
 
Lianxiang fengyun (The Legend of Lenovo联想风云) is a history of the Chinese 
computer company Lenovo (Lianxiang联想) and the biography of its CEO, Liu 
Chuanzhi (b. 1944). It was published in January 2005 by China Citic Press and 
remained on the China Cities Book Sales Chart for two months from its launch. 
After a first print run of 200,000, fees for its second print run were estimated at 1 
million RMB, with eventual sales of 800,000 copies predicted.49   
 
Liu started his company in 1984 with ten friends and startup capital of a mere 
RMB 200,000. From the success of its Chinese character software in the late 
1980s, it entered the PC and subsequently the laptop manufacturing sector in the 
1990s. By the end of the decade, it was China’s leading computer manufacturer 
and vendor, ranking number one in China’s Top 100 Electronic Enterprises in 
1999. In 2000 it ranked among the world’s top 10 best-managed PC vendors, and 
became a publicly listed stock on Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index.50 In December 
2004, Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC sector for USD 1.25 billion, to become the 
world’s third largest PC maker. 
Lianxiang fengyun was written by celebrated reportage journalist and Chief Editor 
                                                        
48 “Yaoming zizhuan,” p. 25. 
49 “Nayichang fenghuaxueyue de shi – guanyu 2005 nian beijing tushu dinghuohui” 那一场风花雪月的事-
关于 2005年北京图书订货会 (That Trivial Incident – About the 2005 Beijing Book Ordering Event), in 
Meiri xinbao 每 日 新 报  (Daily Newspaper), 20 January 2005, 
<http://www.tianjindaily.com.cn/docroot/200501/20/xb02/20350501.htm> Date accessed: 1 June 2006. 
50 “Company History,” <http://www.pc.ibm.com/ca/about_lenovo/companyhistory.html> Date accessed: 1 
June 2006. 
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of the central government’s People’s Daily (Renmin ribao人民日报) newspaper, 
Ling Zhijun. Ling is celebrated as a straight-talking, level-headed critic of 
contemporary Chinese society and known particularly for earlier bestsellers such 
as Jiaofeng (Crossing Swords交锋) and Bianhua (Changes变化), which tackle 
current political economic issues in historical context. Ling was invited by the 
Lenovo CEO to write a history of the company from what the latter called “an 
outsider’s objective point of view.”51 The book is marketed as revealing the 
secrets of the Chinese company’s success and tracing its development as a 
microcosm of China’s rise over the past two decades. China’s economic history 
and its political and social contexts thus constitute a central focus of the book. 
 
The biography of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), Ta gaibianle 
zhongguo: Jiang Zemin zhuan (The Man Who Changed China: Jiang Zemin他改
变了中国：江泽民传) was first written in English by American finance and 
management mogul, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, and has been internationally 
marketed and translated into Chinese, Japanese, Korean and German. Kuhn is a 
successful investment banker whose eclectic portfolio also includes international 
finance and management consultancy, public advocacy and funding of science and 
technology related research and education, and authorship of over 25 books on a 
wide array of topics. A periodic advisor to the Chinese government on issues of 
economics, technology and the media since 1989, Kuhn has also worked with 
                                                        
51 Numerous book reviews and interviews quote Liu Chuanzhi as having asked Ling Zhijun “only to take a 
look at Lenovo from an outsider’s perspective.” Ling is often quoted describing himself as an “outsider,” and 
reviewers praise his book for offering an outsider’s objective perspective (局外人的客观视角). 
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numerous Chinese government offices, including the State Council Information 
Office, Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Publicity. Kuhn makes use of this 
exposure to Chinese politics and access to official personnel to conduct interviews 
with people who have known and worked with Jiang, but avoids interviewing the 
man himself, he claims, so as to avoid being influenced by Jiang’s own opinions.52
 
Criticized in the American academe for being a hagiographic tribute to the 
Chinese leader that must have enjoyed a high level of official sanction if not 
Jiang’s direct personal approval,53 Kuhn’s biography of Jiang is an undoubtedly 
celebratory one. The narrative presents him as the president who successfully set 
China on the path of economic reform, development, stability and international 
recognition. It charts the rise of Jiang and China in parallel – from their struggles 
during the war against Japan and their suffering through the decades of political 
upheaval that followed – to culminate with the end of Jiang’s career bringing both 
the man and the nation to economic rationality, peace and prosperity in the present. 
This rendition of events has been disparaged by American sinologists such as 
Bruce Gilley as too lacking in methodological rigor to be considered either a 
biography or a history. The book is best seen instead, Gilley argues, as a classic 
work of Chinese government “agitprop” for which Kuhn has been used as a 
                                                        
52 Duan Yigang 段毅刚, “Ku En: Wo xuehui yong lishi de guandian kan zhongguo” 库恩：我学会用历史的
观点看中国 (Kuhn: I Learnt to See China From a Historical Perspective), in Meiri xinbao 每日新报 (Sina 
News), 20 May 2005, <http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2005-05-20/08245938617s.shtml >. Date accessed: 1 June 
2006. 
53 John Walsh, “The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin by Robert Lawrence 
Kuhn,” <http://www.asianreviewofbooks.com/arb/article.php?article=503>; Liu Binyan 刘滨雁, “Reading 
the Jiang Zemin Biography ‘He Changed China,’” <http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20050214_1.htm>. Date 
accessed: 1 June 2006. 
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mouthpiece without his even knowing it.54
 
Regardless of their merit, such accusations have not prevented Kuhn’s book from 
becoming a runaway bestseller in China. Published in January 2005 by the 
Shanghai Translation Press, Ta gaibianle zhongguo stayed on the China Cities 
Book Sales Charts and People Magazine’s New Biographies Chart from its release 
through to July. After a first print run of 200,000, it went through five reprints to 
sell a total of approximately 1.1 million copies.55  
 
The book was marketed in China as offering a Westerner’s (xifangren 西方人) 
perspective on the Chinese leader and on Chinese history and culture in general. 
Framed as a great admirer of Jiang’s, Kuhn is said to have worked tirelessly to 
understand Jiang’s life’s work and to now have a greater appreciation of the man 
than many Chinese people themselves have. As a Westerner, he is thought to 
provide content that “Chinese authors would never be able to write,” and yet 
which is acceptable to Chinese audiences because he has a “friendly attitude and 
an understanding of China’s conditions.”56 Defending himself against accusations 
                                                        
54 Bruce Gilley, “In China’s Own Eyes,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 84 No. 5 (September/October 2005), pp. 
150-154; For a follow-up exchange between Gilley and Kuhn, see Bruce Gilley and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, 
“One Country, Two Prisms,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 85 No. 1 (January/February 2006), pp. 167-168. 
55 Liu Jun刘俊, “Jiang Zemin zhuan yin xijie changxiao rangren kandao lingdaoren de renxing jiaose” 江泽
民传因细节畅销让人看到领导人的人性角色 (Jiang Zemin’s Biography Sells Well Because of Details, 
Giving a Glimpse of the Leader’s Personality), in Shidai renwu zhoukan 时代人物周刊 (Times People 
Magazine), 25 July 2005, <http://www.ewen.cc/books/bkview.asp?bkid=90947&cid=239944>. Date accessed: 
1 June 2006. 
56 Li Liang李梁, “‘Ta gaibianle zhongguo: Jiang zemin zhuan’ buyiban de changxiaoshu”《他改变了中国：
江泽民传》不一般的畅销书 (Jiang Zemin’s Biography is No Ordinary Bestseller), in Nanfang zhoumo南方
周末 (Southern Weekend), 13 May 2005,  
<http://www.ewen.cc/books/bkview.asp?bkid=86401&cid=223071>. Date accessed: 1 June 2006. 
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that his high esteem for Jiang has made him less critical, Kuhn is quoted as 
saying: 
It is true that I am passionate about China and respect Jiang Zemin, 
and I confess that writing this book has only made me more so… 
Some people, especially Western critics, will criticize my work and 
my point of view, but I can honestly say that I believe everything I 
have written to be true.57  
Kuhn’s biography of Jiang thus offers Chinese readers a favorable view of their 
nation that can be regarded as authoritative and especially valuable because it 
comes from the mouth of a Western expert. It is in this sense then that “having a 
Westerner write this book has greatly facilitated the understanding of Jiang Zemin 
and of China in general.”58
 
Womensa is the memoir of Chinese writer, critic and translator Yang Jiang (b. 
1911), wife of the previously mentioned May Fourth intellectual, Qian Zhongshu. 
Born in 1910, Qian Zhongshu was most famous for his short story Fortress 
Besieged (Weicheng围城), his translations of Mao’s collected works and as a 
professor of literature at Tsinghua and later Beijing University. Yang Jiang is 
known for her Chinese translation of Cervante’s Don Quixote and her novel 
Shower (Xizao洗澡), which was made into a highly successful movie in 1999. As 
                                                        
57 Ibid. For an extended interview with Robert Kuhn on his motivations and methods in writing his biography 
of Jiang, see “Bringing True Story of China to the World (03/01/05),” 
<http://us.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t185229.htm>. Date accessed: 1 June 2006. 
58 Li Liang, “Ta gaibianle zhongguo.” 
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intellectuals from the pre-liberation ‘Old Society’ (jiushehui 旧社会), Yang and 
Qian suffered through the turbulent decades of the Mao era and Cultural 
Revolution. Written shortly after the death of both their daughter Qian Yuan in 
1997 and Qian Zhongshu himself in 1998, Womensa is Yang Jiang’s personal 
reminiscence of the family’s history. Written as a highly personal and emotive 
story of their lives from the 1930s up to the present, it tells of the ways in which 
an ordinary family was affected by economic conditions and political tumult 
during this period.  
 
Published by SDX Joint Publishing Company in July 2003, Womensa was a 
runaway bestseller that appeared on and off the charts from then through until July 
2005. Selling more than 500,000 copies, it went to its second print-run within one 
month of its release and by 2006 had gone through 20 reprints. The SDX Joint 
Publishing Company was formed in Hong Kong in 1948 under CCP’s direction, as 
a combination of three existing Shanghai-based presses. In 1949 its headquarters 
was moved to Beijing and in 1951 the press was combined with the People’s Press. 
The two were separated again in 1986 and both are now members of the China 
Publishing Group. SDX is now widely considered one of the most reputable and 
popular publishers of humanities and social sciences books in China. Its stated 
focus is not on simply producing bestsellers, but on maintaining high literary 
standards while also being commercially competitive. 
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Buchengyangzi de huainian (Unpresentable Memories不成样子的怀念) is the 
memoir of renowned Chinese writer Wang Meng (b. 1934). Wang Meng has 
published prolifically since the 1950s, and is currently a lecturer and honorary 
lecturer at numerous Chinese universities, as well as vice-Chairman of the CWA. 
He joined the CCP as an underground party member at the age of 14, but was 
labeled a rightist in 1958 and sent out into the countryside for reeducation and 
manual labor. He was rehabilitated in 1979 and re-entered the Party fold to 
become secretary of the CWA two years later. From 1986 to 1989, he served as 
Minister of Culture.59
 
Wang’s memoirs are a collection of essays on various literary and cultural figures 
from the revolutionary old guard, whom he has had personal interactions and 
friendships with. Centered on cultural icons many of whom are now aging and 
passing away, his recollections are mostly eulogizing tributes to a generation of 
revolutionary greats. His representation of both the past and its implications for 
the present closely adhere to the party-state’s line. Wang commemorates the 
patriotic spirit of the elder generation, for instance, approvingly echoes the central 
government’s post-1978 attitude to economic rationality, and argues that a single 
strong party is still better for China today than political plurality. 
 
The book was released by the People’s Literature Press in June 2005 with an 
                                                        
59 Wang Meng王蒙, Wang meng zishu: wode rensheng zhexue王蒙自述：我的人生哲学 (Wang Meng On 
Himself: My Philosophy on Life), (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 人民文学出版社, 2003), pp. 
306-307. 
 76
initial print run of 200,000. It immediately entered the China Cities Book Sales 
Charts and became a bestseller at the Shanghai Book Fair as well as at the Xizhu 
nationwide bookstore. The People’s Literature Press was established by the central 
government in 1951 to be the national level press for literature and is currently a 
member of the China Publishing Group. While remaining well within 
state-approved boundaries, it has also been very commercially successful, 
publishing major bestselling titles from Chinese classics to Korean television 
drama spin-offs to the translated Harry Potter series. 
 
Hongdijinzi: liuqishi niandai de Beijing haizi (Gold Letters on a Red Base: 
Beijing Children of the Sixties and Seventies 红底金字：六七十年代的北京孩子) 
is an encyclopedia of everyday life for Beijing children of the sixties and seventies. 
It is an exercise in nostalgia, recollecting everything from pencil cases and foods 
to books, movies and schoolyard games. Written from the childhood memories of 
author Liu Yangdong (b. circa 1965) and editor Lin Dong (b. circa 1965), 
Hongdijinzi represents the Cultural Revolution as an era of fun and fond memories 
for an entire generation. Focusing on the lost rituals of the period, they completely 
neutralize the political motivations and implications of the movement. Filtered 
through the decades and changes, the Cultural Revolution that they remember is 
not a political movement but an aesthetically rich community experience.  
 
Hongdijinzi was published in February 2005 by the China Youth Press (Zhongguo 
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qingnian chubanshe 中国青年出版社), the directly administered publishing 
institution of the Communist Youth League of China (Zhongguo gongqingtuan中
国共青团). Since its establishment in 1950, it has been the channel through which 
the central government targets the young. Its publications thus represent state 
efforts to package its messages in forms that are appealing and competitive in the 
commercial book market. Unlike the other five bestsellers, Hongdijinzi is targeted 
specifically at the local readership of Beijing, where it appeared in a first print run 
of 10,000. It entered the Beijing Book Building bestseller chart, remained on the 
Sanlian Book Center bestseller chart for four months running and on The Beijing 
News non-fiction bestseller chart for seven weeks running. While this 
performance does not equal those of titles with nation-wide target markets, 
Hongdijinzi represents local variants of the bestseller phenomenon that parallel 
and supplement their all-city counterparts. 
 
These six titles vary widely in terms of the profile of their subjects, the orientation 
of their publishers as well as the number of copies printed and sold. Hongdijinzi, 
for example, was written by an ordinary Beijinger, was targeted primarily at the 
local readership of Beijing and printed in a relatively modest run of 10,000. Ta 
gaibianle zhongguo, meanwhile, was an international phenomenon, written by a 
globally prominent American, translated into multiple languages and marketed in 
China as offering a ‘Westerner’s’ point of view. The first biography of a former 
Chinese President to have been published during his lifetime, the book sold close 
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to one million copies in cities all across China. While they may be varied in scale, 
however, all six titles gained a prominent presence on charts and bookshelves, and 
in mainstream newspapers and magazines between 2003 and 2005. Covering the 
spectrum from the localized, smaller scale project to the massive nationwide 
production, this selection thus constitutes a representative cross-section of the 
current industry for bestseller biographies and memoirs. 
 
This industry is an outgrowth of on-going interactions between commercial forces 
and the Chinese government’s regulatory and participatory activities. The titles 
that it produces are thus nexuses of the state, the market and the people, which by 
aligning the interests of all three are able to achieve a level of distribution high 
enough to be considered an item of popular culture. Commonly seen as a subgenre 
of history, these biographies and memoirs are widely enjoyed in urban China as 
accessible, entertaining and informative supplements to the more orthodox forms 
of Chinese history. While the individual life stories that they tell may vary, their 
narratives are identical in the representation of several key national historical 
trends and events. Tracing these points of commonality will sketch the underlying 
conception of China’s recent history that pervades the bestseller industry as a 
whole. The broad, collective meta-narrative in which all their stories are set, that 
is, emerges as the bestselling historical narrative of the nation, a form of popular 
history aboard in urban China today. 
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CHAPTER 4: 




Despite the varied emphases of these selected case-studies, all six stories unfold upon 
an underlying narrative of increasing material comfort – from deprivation and 
struggle in the 1950s through 1970s, to a first-time experience of economic prosperity 
that begins in the 1980s and accrues into the present. This change is represented both 
in the immediate reality of the individual biographical subjects’ everyday lives and as 
part of a wider phenomenon of national economic development.  
 
At the level of material life, the deprivation of the early decades is described both as 
the specific situation of the biographical subject, and as a general condition under 
which the community as a whole lives. Poor housing conditions and the scarcity of 
food and clothing characterize life from the 1950s to 1970s for the subjects of all six 
books. These struggles are not presented as the result of their own doing, but as 
symptoms of a nation-wide economic malaise that defined the lives of all Chinese 
people. A struggling Liu Chuanzhi, for instance, is contextualized as just one among 
the many anonymous others who suffered the urban Chinese economy of the 1950s 
and 1960s.1 The fact that even Jiang Zemin could not afford a new jacket and indeed 
often went hungry in those days, is a clear testament to the all-pervasiveness of the 
                                                 
1  Ling Zhijun 凌志军 , Lianxiang fengyun 联想风云  (The Legend of Lenovo), (Beijing: Citic 
Publishing House, 2005), p. 26. 
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period’s material lack.2 Although he was born after the Cultural Revolution, even Yao 
Ming writes that he grew up in a China that was still reeling from its economic effects. 
He describes the difficulty that people like his mother had in procuring food and the 
dismal conditions faced by professional basketball players in China at the time.3  
 
By sheer contrast to these descriptions, developments since the late 1970s then appear 
in an overwhelmingly positive light. After decades of scraping by on meager material 
and financial resources, that is, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and the 
development they engendered are represented as ushering in a long-desired change. 
For several biographical subjects, market reform is the very condition that made their 
success possible and hence is depicted as a glorious dawn of opportunities. Liu 
Chuanzhi’s story, for instance, presents Deng’s radical economic policies as having 
unleashed capabilities amongst the people that had long been suppressed. The spirit 
of a new age is said to have pervaded every corner of the nation after the central 
government declared economic reform an “urgent requirement” (poqie xuyao迫切需
要 ) in 1984. 4  Liu sensed a change in the air, as “two billion urban dwellers 
experienced the most important psychological revolution in history: poverty and 
oppression became unbearable, and people began earnestly and honestly to pursue 
prosperity, and a new life.” 5  In Jiang Zemin’s story, Deng’s 1978 reforms are 
represented as marking the beginning of the most rapid growth spurt in China’s 
                                                 
2 Robert Kuhn 罗伯特 库恩, Ta gaibianle zhongguo: Jiang zemin zhuan 他改变了中国：江泽民传 
(The Man who Changed China: Jiang Zemin), (Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 上海译文出版社, 2006), p. 
72.  
3 Yao Ming 姚明, Wode shijie wode meng 我的世界我的梦 (My World, My Dream), (Changjiang 
wenyi chubanshe, 2004), p. 46. 
4 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 24. 
5 Ibid., p. 27. 
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history,6 a process that rapidly turned China into an economic superpower on the path 
towards modernization and prosperity, which would otherwise have taken many long 
years to achieve.7  
 
Even for those whose success did not hinge on economic liberalization, Deng’s 
reforms are equated with progress and material prosperity. Although Wang Meng’s 
memoirs are primarily focused on literary and cultural history rather than economic 
development, for instance, he too passionately affirms Deng’s policies. Indeed, Wang 
recalls the sheer joy with which even the Communist revolutionary generation of 
patriots received the news of Deng’s reforms. Early Party writer and editor Zhang 
Guangnian (张光年), for instance, was moved to the verge of tears with impassioned 
gratification.8 While Yao Ming does not include Deng in his basketball history, he too 
expresses approval for China’s economic development by observing the remarkable 
discrepancy between the resources available to basketball players in the 1960s and 
today. Whereas players used to have to wear cheap shoes, wash their own uniforms 
and sleep six to a room with no heating, they now train with high-quality basketballs 
and Nike shoes.9 Standing comfortably in the present, Yao Ming reflects, “All I can 
think about the past now is, doesn’t it sound terribly frightful?”10
 
                                                 
6 Kuhn, Ta gaibianle zhongguo, p. 89. 
7 Ibid., p. 182. 
8 Wang Meng 王蒙 , Bucheng yangzi de huainian 不成样子的怀念  (Unpresentable Memories), 
(Renmin wenxue chubanshe 人民文学出版社, 2005), pp. 242-243. 
9 Yao, Wode shijie, p. 47. 
10 Ibid. 
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These representations equate Deng-era reforms with economic development and the 
blessed arrival of material prosperity on a national scale. The personal experience of 
the rise to riches, however, is always a narrative of the individual. As each 
biographical subject accumulates the fruits of economic prosperity, s/he rises up from 
the ranks of his or her community alone. S/he becomes one whose figurative story 
and physical experience are those of an individual rather than of a collective. In Liu 
Chuanzhi’s early years, for instance, we see him struggling to make ends meet and 
innovatively setting up home and office with a large group of friends and neighbors. 
As his business gathers momentum, however, we read less about how the community 
around him fares and more about how he moves into progressively larger and brighter 
apartments to finally arrive at the luxurious, 300 square-meter “Ten Thousand 
Springs New Estate” in 2000.11  
 
Of Wang Meng’s collection of portraits, the only figure who is highlighted for 
coming into financial wealth, Feng Jicai (冯骥才), is portrayed as “using his success 
to aggressively boost his own standard of living.” By stark contrast to the great 
collective spirit of the revolutionary days, Feng’s life now consists of constantly 
uprooting and relocating himself, as he climbs up in society by continuously moving 
into better, more expensive apartments.12 Yao Ming, meanwhile, luxuriates quite 
shamelessly in the creature comforts afforded to him by his new life in America. The 
rest of China, to his mind, lags pitifully behind. The Houston Rockets’ private jet has 
introduced him to a level of personal comfort he never imagined was possible and is 
                                                 
11 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 26. 
12 Wang, Bucheng yangzi, p. 213.  
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the one thing he misses most when touring with the China team.13 Indeed, living 
between the two countries for him is like being alternately a rich man and a pauper, 
switching back and forth between wealth in America and indigence in China.14 He 
self-consciously acknowledges that this makes him sound like “a real capitalist,” but 
assures readers that this takes nothing away from his unabated love for China.15
 
The material deprivation of the past is thus represented as a collective experience, 
while the enjoyment of wealth in the present is depicted as an individual one. 
Underlying this difference is the general sense of a shift having occurred sometime 
between the 1970s and the1990s, from a strongly community-based way of life 
towards a more individualistic one. While the comforts of economic development are 
welcome, the resultant loss of a strongly community-based lifestyle is thus to a 
certain extent lamented. Liu Yangdong’s nostalgia project, for instance, wistfully 
describes the sixties and seventies as an era in which “collectivity was still the 
norm,”16 and lives were bound together by the various activities that everybody 
participated in together. Even the generally quiet and highly privatized activity of 
book reading, for example, became a group activity during the Cultural Revolution.17 
As he describes this and other aspects of neighborhood, street and school life, Liu 
repeatedly emphasizes the absolute commonality of the activities. Every child in 
                                                 
13 Yao, Wode shijie, p. 241.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 242. 
16 Liu Yangdong 刘仰东, Hongdi jinzi: liuqishi niandai de Beijing haizi 红底金字：六七十年代的北
京孩子 (Gold Letters on a Red Base: Children of Sixties and Seventies Beijing), (Zhongguo qingnian 
chubanshe 中国青年出版社, 2005), p. 11. 
17 Liu, Hongdi jinzi, p. 183. 
 84
Beijing, he often writes, was familiar with this or that object or pastime.18 Indeed, 
many things in that era were experienced by every child regardless of whether they 
were in or outside of Beijing.19 This certainty that experiences were shared or had in 
common is depicted as providing the individual with a sturdy sense of community 
that Liu does not find in the present. Although Yao Ming is personally appalled by 
the living conditions of the past, his biography too includes anecdotes about 
community living in those days. A short contribution by his manager, Zhang Mingji 
(章明基), for example, fondly recalls how his parents had had a television set that 
they would set up outside so that more people could enjoy watching it. Sometimes, 
more than 200 people would gather together to watch it’s nine-inch, black-and-white 
screen.20
 
Juxtaposed with these descriptions of bustling streets and neighborhood communities, 
the new life of comfort in lavish but sequestered apartments is thus tinged with 
nostalgia for the old days. Although Liu Chuanzhi has attained luxury condominium 
ownership, for example, the home that he and his family lived in for the longest and 
which will always hold the most memories and joy for them is the basement shack 
they set up in the 1970s.21 For Wang Meng, the good times are set even further back 
in the revolutionary era of the 1950s and 1960s. Compared to a literary world 
presently populated by “posturing, clamorous and self-aggrandizing fools,”22  the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 31 and p. 153. 
19 Ibid., p. 1. 
20 Yao, Wode shijie, pp. 46-47. 
21 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 26. 
22 Wang, Bucheng yangzi, p. 261. 
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1950s were “a glorious era in which everybody worked together tirelessly.”23 As for 
Liu Yangdong, his encyclopedia of everyday life in the 1960s and 1970s is 
fundamentally a project of commemorating things that no longer are, regardless of 
how good the present may be. 
 
Yet like all nostalgia, these sentiments merely express a passive lament and not a call 
to action. The benefit of development that has necessitated the erasure of certain 
things is thus tacitly recognized as outweighing the value of those sacrifices. While 
Liu Yangdong’s strong emotional attachment to the past causes him to lament its loss, 
for example, even he concedes the legitimacy of another voice that is “not necessarily 
without reason.” This is the voice of modernization, which argues that “nothing lasts 
forever because change is in the nature of history.”24 Thus while objects and habits 
may be mourned as they disappear, the bestselling historical narrative expresses no 




Another way in which lament over the passing of the past is expressed is through the 
tracing of generational divisions. In all six books, generational categories provide the 
most commonly referred to basis of identity after that of the ‘China person’ 
(Zhongguo ren 中国人). Three broad generations are identified – those who were 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 46. 
24 Liu, Hongdi jinzi, p. 6. 
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young and active in the early days of the Communist revolution, during the Cultural 
Revolution, and in the Dengist reform era of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Although Wang Meng begins his memoirs with the specifically stated intention of 
reaching out to readers of all ages and thus “transcending generation gaps through his 
care and well-meaning concern,”25 he nevertheless proceeds throughout the book to 
address both his readers and subjects based on their generational membership. Within 
the very same page, for instance, Wang reveals the envy he feels towards the young 
people, though he knows that they may not avoid the same childish rashness of “our 
youth.”26 Eulogizing various revolutionary era icons throughout his book, he goes on 
to repeatedly compare that generation of literary figures with the present one. 
Targeting those who were children during the Cultural Revolution, Liu Yangdong’s 
memoirs also revolve around those aspects of life that constitute a generational 
identity. In addition to enumerating the multifarious experiences they had in common, 
Liu further cements the boundaries of his generation with assertions that children of 
the generations since could not possibly understand his. The passion that his 
generation has for the Chinese classic, Legend of the Water Margin (Shuihuzhuan水
浒传), for instance, is something that he insists children today could not possibly 
comprehend.27 Similarly, the story of Liu Chuanzhi’s life is littered with details and 
jokes that “young people today would not comprehend, while those who have come 
out of that era would instantly recognize.”28 While Yao Ming and Yang Jiang tackle 
                                                 
25 Wang, Bucheng yangzi, p. ii.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Liu, Hongdi jinzi, p. 186. 
28 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 21, p. 25 and p. 38. 
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these issues less directly, they too identify themselves by the generations to which 
they belong – Yao as one born after the end of the Cultural Revolution,29 and Yang as 
one who came over into “New China” in 1949 from the “Old Society.”30
 
Accompanying this tendency to trace and retrace generational divisions is the 
prevalent notion that one’s character is shaped by the historical eras one has lived 
through. Not only is one’s identity decided by year of birth, one’s very personality is 
depicted as being heavily influenced, if not downright determined by, whether one 
has lived through the early Communist revolutionary era, the Cultural Revolution or 
the current era of reform. Liu Chuanzhi’s former business partner Ni Guangnan (倪光
南), for instance, is said to have become humble, inwardly restrained, determined, 
and suspecting because he grew up with a father who was a KMT member in the 
1940s.31 Another former business partner who left the company on bad terms, Wang 
Shuhe (王树和), is said to have become  
 
timid and cowardly because his father was labeled a feudal landowner 
during the 1950s class struggle. Wang spent the first part of his life in 
great fear, and has never been able to genuinely relax. While the 
younger generation might find this impossible to comprehend, anyone 
from that era would instantly understand. In light of these facts, 
                                                 
29 Yao, Wode shijie, p. 46. 
30 Yang Jiang 杨绛, Womensa 我们仨 (Us Three), (Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian 生活读书
新知三联书店, 2003). 
31 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 38. 
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Wang’s eventual self-extrication from the company was basically 
inevitable.32  
 
Jiang Zemin is also portrayed as having been fundamentally shaped by his experience 
of China’s history from the Japanese invasion through to the Cultural Revolution.33 
Among the people he governs, however, is a young and rising generation that is well 
educated and increasingly wealthy, and which has not experienced even the Cultural 
Revolution – let alone the Great Leap Forward, the Anti-Right movements, the KMT-
CCP civil war or the war of resistance against Japan. Their different historical 
experiences are said to make this generation a fundamentally different people. 
Oblivious to historical events, for instance, they have grown up “accustomed to going 
where they want to, eating and wearing what they want, thinking and saying what 
they want to.”34  
 
Putting together the conviction with which generational categories are drawn 
according to historical eras, and the formative effect that historical eras are thought to 
have on one’s character, then makes it relatively easy to characterize and compare 
entire generations of Chinese people. All six books do this at some level and two 
opposing opinions emerge from their often and sweepingly-made comparisons. The 
first is that the present generation is not as good as the previous one; the second is 
that the present generation is or will be better than the previous one. True to his 
project of romanticizing the past, for instance, Liu Yangdong finds many ways in 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 21. 
33 Kuhn, Ta gaibianle zhongguo, p. 462. 
34 Ibid., p. 449. 
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which the generation growing up in educational and recreational plenty today are 
actually inferior to those who grew up in his time of educational systemic breakdown 
and lack. People his age whom he speaks to, for example, list numerous aspects of 
children’s lives today that are not comparable to the way things were when they 
themselves were young.35 The consensus Liu gathers is that: 
 
In spite of the money and effort spent on them, children today are far 
less culturally educated than the ill-disciplined kids of the 1960s and 
1970s. Teachers complain that each batch of students is worse than the 
previous one. The reason for this is precisely that those who 
supposedly missed out on formal education were not hemmed in by 
rules and pressures, textbooks and classrooms, but free to read what 
they liked. That is what has resulted in this situation of the present not 
being as good as the past (jinburuxi 今不如昔).36
 
Eulogizing elderly cultural icons who are quickly passing away, Wang Meng sets the 
revolutionary generation up as a noble, dedicated, patriotic and capable one that 
younger generations do not seem able to match. Wang frequently refers to members 
of today’s literary circle by contrast to the revolutionary era generation as weak and 
self-pitying,37 noisome, imitating and otherwise lacking in substance.38 With each 
figure who passes and as their numbers dwindle, Wang Meng wonders rhetorically if 
                                                 
35 Liu, Hongdi jinzi, p. 192. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Wang, Bucheng yangzi, p. 37. 
38 Ibid., p. 261. 
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there will still be others like them to take their place. The answer, he hints, is not 
likely.39
 
Yet at other points in his book, Wang Meng adopts quite the opposite attitude. The 
envy he professes towards the younger generation in his preface is picked up later, in 
his perception of the advantages that they have over their predecessors. They will be 
more mature and able to reap the benefits of the elder generation’s suffering, he 
writes.40 Robert Kuhn too in his biography of Jiang expresses a similar opinion, 
predicting that younger generations who have not experienced the trauma and 
suffering of China’s recent history will be more rational and less emotional in their 
analyses and decision-making.41
 
Whether the current generation is presented as being better or worse than the past 
ones, however, both perspectives have the same effect of reinforcing generational 
belonging as the primary basis of individual identity. In the bestselling historical 
narrative of the nation then, generational differences provide the lens through which 
the Chinese population as a whole is seen. This is exemplified in Liu Yangdong’s 
recollections, Wang Meng’s eulogies and Robert Kuhn’s analysis of the national 
trends that Jiang Zemin faces. Generational differences also provide the filter through 
which the individual is identified, as in descriptions of Jiang Zemin, Liu Chuanzhi, 
Yang Jiang and Yao Ming. This constant re-inscription of generational divides has 
the effect of shifting attention away from, and thereby sidelining, other lines of 
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41 Kuhn, Ta gaibianle zhongguo, p. 467. 
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division that exist within the ‘China-person’ identity. Liu Yangdong and Ling 
Zhichen’s repeated insistence that every person from the time has had this or that 
experience, for example, accumulates to create a sense that the only difference that 
exists among Chinese people is the year in which they were born. Broad 
characterizations that sweep into their wide embrace every member of a given age-
group from all across the nation, generational identities effectively subsume other 
potentially more divisive and destabilizing identities, such as those based on gender, 
class, politics, geography or ethnicity.  
 
Indeed, although they are clearly drawn, generational divisions do not even really 
divide the Chinese people. Rather, they unite people by incorporating them into 
groups that are then strung together in a single line of descent and heritage. From this 
perspective, the two apparently opposing opinions on the qualities of the present 
generation in relation to the past one do not in fact contradict each other. The younger 
generation may be less passionate about their country and its politics, but this may 
make them more rational. They may be more individualistic, but this may mean they 
are better evolved for survival in the competitive market economy of the future. 
Worries that young people today are not as good as their elders thus run parallel to 
hopes that they may in fact be better than them. As a conception of national history, 
these generalizations express anxieties that accompany great hopes for the nation in 
the near future because immutably divided as they may be, the different generations 
are ultimately at work on the same project – that is, the strength and well-being of 
China. Ambivalence toward the young arises from a common concern for the future 
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of China, which the young are seen as inheriting from their elders. Though 
contributing in different ways and at different points, all generations are traveling 
together along the same path of China’s historical progress. The people are thus 
divided into different generations, which are then united in a narrative of national 
continuity and progress by their common commitment to China’s well-being. 
 
Political Change  
 
While socio-economic changes are depicted in the bestselling historical narrative as 
real events with palpable effects, the drastic political changes that occurred in China 
since 1949 are represented as being somewhat removed from the immediate reality of 
people’s lives. The most commonly recalled of these is the Cultural Revolution. 
While it is undeniable that this decade-long movement had a massive impact on daily 
life however, its specifically political aspects are presented only as vague and distant, 
barely comprehensible issues. Participation in its activities is uniformly depicted in all 
six books as passive, uninformed and misguided. Yang Jiang’s daughter, for example, 
was swept into party membership and activities that she did not understand.42 As a 
victim, Yang’s husband suffered through persecution never knowing what crime he 
had committed but trying his best to cooperate and conform nonetheless.43 Also 
targeted intellectuals, Wang Meng and his companions had found it impossible to 
separate genuine party commands from calls that were made merely in the party’s 
name. This left them with no choice but to confusedly force themselves to accept 
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every shocking accusation that was leveled at them in the name of the party.44  
Students at the time, Liu Yangdong and his companions may have read the Marxist-
Leninist classics that abounded at the time, but they “never really understood any of 
it.” All they retained of The Communist Manifesto, for instance, was its opening 
line.45 On the ground, then, the Cultural Revolution is represented not so much as a 
political experience than as a period of confused and bungled acquiescence in 
whatever force it was that seemed so overwhelming at the time. 
 
Indeed, although China was rocked by political movements throughout the twentieth 
century, the real lives of all six biographical subjects were always carried on 
elsewhere. A political change was relevant to them only in terms of the direct, 
material rather than political impact it had on their lives. Yang Jiang, for instance, 
saw her family as the most important aspect of life. While she marks her calendar by 
national political events, she uses this chronology only to narrate occurrences that 
were actually in the personal lives of her family members. World War II, for example, 
was a time various family members suffered illnesses, moved houses or changed 
jobs.46 The founding of the PRC in 1949 meant only that she and her husband 
continued their work and to keep to themselves, but in an all-new China.47 The Anti-
Right movement of 1957 meant no more family visits,48 while the 1974 Anti-Lin and 
Anti-Confucius campaign marks the period of time around which her husband fell 
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seriously ill. 49  The Cultural Revolution is mentioned as having temporarily 
interrupted Qian Zhongshu’s work (translating Mao Zedong’s poetry), but this was 
promptly picked up again in 1974.50 “Political exercises may have come up one after 
the other, but Zhongshu and I never stopped our (literary) work.”51 Even as prominent 
revolution era cultural workers whose professional positions were close to the central 
government, therefore, Yang Jiang and her family were then determinedly indifferent 
to the twists and turns of its politics. 
 
Wang Meng’s cultural workers were considerably more concerned with the grand-
scale issue of the well-being of China’s literature. Many of them held Marxism, 
Leninism and Maoism close to their hearts and to this extent were ideologically 
supportive of the CCP. Their allegiance and the root of their concern however, was 
not to the CCP-defined state, but to the cultural, civilizational China that long 
predates the People’s Republic. Profoundly concerned for this China and its literary 
tradition, they supported the Party insofar as they believed it could prescribe what 
was best for China’s literature.52 Manifest in its various campaigns and movements, 
however, the Party’s politics were to them a confusing but distinctly formidable threat. 
The Cultural Revolution is therefore represented as a period of protecting intellectuals 
and their literature from an incomprehensible and generalized danger.53 Silenced by 
the senselessness of it all, patriots like Feng Mu (冯牧) could only sigh and do their 
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best to shelter what little life of literature they could.54 Thus while the tumult of 
politics rolled on, the object of attention and concern was always the protection and 
promotion of Chinese literature and culture. 
 
For Liu Yangdong and his friends growing up at the time meanwhile, the Cultural 
Revolution simply meant a different set of recreations and toys. Every child 
clambered to join the Children’s Red Army (Hongxiaobing红小兵)55  and every 
teenager the Red Army proper (Hongweibing红卫兵), simply because their arm 
banners looked so smart and they were the grandest organizations around for their age 
groups.56  “When the Cultural Revolution began, pencil boxes were printed with 
pictures of a rising sun or quotes from Mao. Toward its end, cotton pencil cases with 
zippers began to appear.”57 “After the Cultural Revolution, there also appeared all 
kinds of erasers, which did not work very well.”58
 
Finally, although Yao Ming was not born until after the Cultural Revolution, he 
provides his understanding of the period as an era of utter folly from a professional 
sports perspective. Sportsmen were low-ranking in society, but basketball received 
some attention because Mao happened to like it. Cultural Revolution policies though, 
resulted in basketball players being sent to do hard labor as part of their re-education. 
They would also train but never played matches, because “the goal of basketball was 
always to become a good party member and citizen rather than to defeat the 
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opponent.” Most comically, because they were so highly valued in Mao’s communist 
society, workers, farmers and soldiers were often called in to critique the basketball 
team’s training sessions and make suggestions on how to improve their game. Of 
course they knew nothing of the sport, Yao writes, and the entire situation was quite 
laughable – but “that is the way people were in those days.”59
 
While the impact on everyday life of ostensibly political movements like the Cultural 
Revolution was thus indubitably pervasive, their actual political content was all but 
lost on the ground. Where political messages and images are recalled, it is as mere 
forms that provided the aesthetic backdrop for, and indeed were often appropriated by, 
distinctly apolitical everyday lives. In Liu Yangdong’s recollection, Mao was a 
constant but incidental feature of the daily landscape, hanging over the classroom 
blackboard and popping up in textbooks. 60  His pithy quotes are interspersed 
throughout the book, but only as old familiar sayings, phrases dropped almost 
flippantly. For Yao Ming, Mao is an image on food stamps that makes him strain to 
imagine how people once thought of Mao as a god.61 As the biographies and memoirs 
of non-political individuals, it is to be expected that these five bestsellers should 
narrate personal stories, using the calendar of national political events simply as a 
convenient frame of reference that readers would be instantly familiar with. As one of 
the forms in which the history of the nation-state is most commonly re-traced, 
however, this practice of the bestselling historical narrative’s has the cumulative 
effect of shifting attention away from the role of politics in China’s recent history. 
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Instead, narratives of both the individual and the nation focus on social and economic 
aspects of life – material conditions, emotional trials, and the joys and costs of 
economic development. 
 
Indeed, despite being the biography of the former President of China, even Jiang 
Zemin’s story is barely an exception to this rule. Throughout the book, Jiang is 
repeatedly presented as an “engineer rather than a theorist,” a doer rather than a 
thinker and a clear-headed proponent of economic practicality over political 
persuasion. Jiang’s rise through Party and government ranks appears to happen 
almost without his effort or comprehension, and sometimes even with great 
reluctance on his part. His policies as President are further depicted as having been 
based on pragmatic considerations of efficiency rather than on ideological agendas. 
The primary function of the political leader thus appears to have been an economic 
one. “A policy might work or it might fail,” he is quoted as saying, “If it fails, amend 
it. If it succeeds, keep it. All that matters is what is most beneficial (youli 有利) for 
China.”62
 
The Bestselling Historical Narrative of the PRC 
 
In their various forms, these stories of immediate socio-economic development on the 
one hand and abstract political confusion on the other, sit comfortably together in a 
grand narrative of China’s historical progress from 1949 to the present. Taken 
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together, they trace a linear path of the nation’s collective maturation from 
revolutionary patriotism in the 1950s, through heady politics and material deprivation 
in the 1960s and 1970s, to post-political pragmatism and economic prosperity from 
the 1980s into the present and future. Through this grand narrative, politics in general 
is represented as a thing of the past. The political movements of the previous fifty 
years are depicted as the merely logical unfolding of China’s historical progress from 
idealism and naiveté to rationality and pragmatism. The present at the end of this 
history is then an epoch that has sensibly grown out of politics and into the wisdom of 
economic practicality. 
 
The sublimation of politics within this grand narrative is achieved firstly with regard 
to the 1949 Communist Revolution, through the neutralization of pro-CCP political 
conviction into purely patriotic zeal and dedication. The choice of the CCP is 
presented as a natural assumption, while the political alternative presented by the 
KMT is completely ignored. Jiang Zemin’s partiality to the CCP, for example, is 
explained as the natural outcome of his growing up in a family of CCP supporters and 
martyrs during the war against Japan. The CCP’s victory over the KMT is then 
depicted through his child’s eyes as an incontrovertible good, his partiality to the 
former being only the logical extension of his familial loyalties and love for his 
country.63 Rather than distinctly political convictions, members of this revolutionary 
generation are characterized by innocent patriotism, youthful sincerity and devotion 
to one another. The cultural figures that Wang Meng commemorates for instance 
were nothing but pure intellectuals and patriots, whose sole motivation was the good 
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of cultural and civilizational China and its people.64 The beliefs that they then held 
are represented not as political opinions, but as transcendental universals.  
 
Young and chasing after revolution, [we saw] a whole new world, in 
which… everything ostentatious, extravagant, wasteful, despicable, 
false and pretending, together with the ossified and oppressive statures 
of feudalism, of the West and of the Party – all were absolutely 
cleansed away, leaving human existence to comprise only sincerity, 
loyalty, light and the energy to change the world.65
 
Such giddy utopianism may well be a mode of discourse common to all revolutions. 
After decades of tumult have indubitably disproved the viability of this vision, 
however, continuing to write about the Communist Revolution in these terms signals 
a conscious historiographic decision. Determinedly representing a historically and 
politically complex revolution in the overly simplistic terms of its own rhetorical self-
representation, Wang preserves the validity of revolutionary beliefs not as politics, 
but as a spirit or passion that lives on despite historical evidence of its limitations and 
pitfalls. One of his subjects, Huang Qiuyun (黄秋耘), concedes that the revolution 
did not unfold quite the way they thought it would. Even so, he still sees its spirit in 
the same positive light of the universal good and given the chance would choose 
revolution all over again.66 The CCP’s rise is thus represented as the result of ideals 
that may have been naïve – but which are now irrevocably lodged in history anyways 
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and not regrettably so. The political history of the period – alternative models and 
routes that were real possibilities then, how they were not realized, why and what 
could have been – is buried under a generalized image of youthful impulsiveness and 
naïveté that leaves only the party’s patriotic zeal in sight. 
 
The other major political movement to be accounted for, the Cultural Revolution is 
then handled as discussed earlier, with the material and social conditions of the period 
being retold in rich detail while the political aspects are only loosely glazed over. 
Indeed, the closest that the bestselling narrative comes to telling a political history of 
the Cultural Revolution is its frequent, passing mentions of the fall of the “Gang of 
Four” (Sirenbang四人帮) as an event synonymous with the end of the disastrous era. 
Comprised of Mao Zedong’s third wife Jiang Qing (江青), Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥), 
Wang Hongwen (王洪文) and Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), this radical clique of left-
wing ideologues had been the outspoken leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group (文
革组). From the early 1970s they occupied key positions in the Politburo, from which 
they sought to block the economic initiatives and political advancement of Deng 
Xiaoping and his supporters, and to influence the wavering and increasingly clouded 
judgment of an ailing Chairman Mao.67 Yang Jiang refers to their arrest following 
Mao Zedong’s death in 197668 and Wang Meng to their “shattering,” “collapse,” and 
“demise [as the event] that finally gave the country’s political and cultural life a new 
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turning point.”69 Robert Kuhn places some blame on Mao for having misguided 
intentions,70 but attributes the active role to the “Gang of Four” for manipulating Mao. 
He too refers with relief to the day when “the tyranny of the ‘Gang of Four’ finally 
came to its end.”71 By referring to the politics of the Cultural Revolution only briefly 
and in passing, and by constantly referring to its end as “the shattering of the Gang of 
Four” (fensui sirenbang粉碎四人帮) the bestselling narrative makes the “Gang” 
seem singularly responsible for the entire costly ten-year calamity. As Liu Yangdong 
notes, “the debts of the ‘left-out generation’ born during the Cultural Revolution have 
all been claimed on the heads of the ‘Gang of Four.”72  
 
Another frame of reference that is frequently used in representations of the Cultural 
Revolution is that of a natural disaster or “great ten-year disaster” (shinian da haojie 
十年大浩劫), which casts the period as a catastrophe beyond human control. Indeed, 
movements during the period are generally described using metaphors of winds and 
waves that seem to sweep everyone up and utterly deprive them of their human 
agency. In the run up to its outbreak, for example, Yang Jiang felt “a tempest on its 
way.”73 Liu Yangdong describes “wave after wave of the movement’s great tide,” and 
its arrival as “a gale and thunderstorm.”74 Wang Meng refers to the “great twelve-
degree typhoon that one could not protect oneself from,”75 and the “all-pervading 
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wind that precedes the mountain rains.” 76  Robert Kuhn writes, “The Cultural 
Revolution swept across the city with the force of a cold winter gale,”77 leaving 
“great chaos under the sky.”78 Such constant reference to the Cultural Revolution in 
the tenor of a natural disaster sidelines the man-made origins of the event and its 
logical development through the historical actions of individuals and organizations. 
The collective subject in these narratives is the victim of a disembodied and 
inexplicable force of political fervor gone mad. By depriving its history of logic and 
human agency, this representation of the Cultural Revolution discourages any further 
pursuit of the accountability of responsible parties – issues that would have 
uncomfortable if not destabilizing implications in the present. Blame becomes 
impossible to attribute and it seems the best thing to do is to allow the event to fade 
without further questioning, as one does not question a tornado or an earthquake. 
 
In the bestselling historical narrative of the nation then, the representation of the 
Cultural Revolution fits neatly into place as a historical anomaly, or a period of time 
in which China temporarily veered off its proper historical path. Wang Meng, for 
instance, circumscribes the period as “a specific historical chapter under specific 
national conditions,”79 and declares its end in 1976 “the return to original ways, 
natural and proper justice done, and the inevitable preponderance of truth.” 80  
Squarely blamed on four denounced and deceased politicians at the top, and 
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sublimated into a natural disaster on the ground, the historical chapter can thereby be 
closed, and hereafter viewed with the healthy remove of a safe historical distance. 
 
One happy subscriber to this approach is Yao Ming, whose reflections on the Cultural 
Revolution comprise light-hearted descriptions of the follies of professional 
basketball during the time. Reflecting on the practice of calling in workers, farmers 
and soldiers to critique basketball players’ skills, Yao writes: 
 
It may sound comical, but I don’t think we should make fun of the 
people of that era. They didn’t know much; they only knew how to do 
what others had instructed them to. Although the workers didn’t 
understand basketball, they felt they had a responsibility. Since they 
were called to critique the game, they would do their best to help. 
Their suggestions may have been strange, but they were earnestly 
trying to help.81
 
Yao’s amicable approach leads him to represents the people of the Cultural 
Revolution as endearingly naïve or uninformed but charmingly sincere, in a version 
of the period is far removed from any suggestion of physical suffering or 
psychological trauma. Indeed, it enables Yao to smoothly resolve the matter as 
entirely non-attributable to acts of human agency in one conclusive statement, “I 
think history has played a joke on us Chinese.”82
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This sense of distance and detachment from the historical period is also what makes 
Liu Yangdong’s project of nostalgia possible, as the ability to look back fondly on the 
period requires that even if accounts have not been settled, they have at least been put 
behind and moved beyond. With the collectedness of one for whom the story has 
become commonplace, Liu thus writes: 
 
The authors and translators who were trialed were trialed, those who 
were jailed were jailed, those who committed suicide committed 
suicide; the countless books that were confiscated from countless 
homes were confiscated, those destroyed were destroyed and those 
kept safe kept safe.83
 
While not quite blasé, Liu is nonetheless comfortable enough with the place of the 
Cultural Revolution in China’s history to celebrate certain aspects of the experience – 
from books and movies to food and household chores. In the background of these 
recollections are matter-of-fact statements of principal torturing activities that every 
student took part in, and evil pranks that were constantly carried out in the name of 
various political exercises. 84  Liu is not dismissive or flippant about these 
misdemeanors, but neither does he agonize over them. Rather, he approaches them as 
the established facts of a sealed off past. “The ‘wise guys’ of those days would now 
certainly be reluctant to reopen the pages of that unflattering chapter in their history,” 
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Liu writes, “Or with the passing years have gradually forgotten all about it.”85 He 
notes, but does not seek to change, the prevalence of such convenient amnesia.  
 
Indeed, the “great ten-year disaster” is represented as a closed and removed enough 
historical chapter that in retrospect, some good can even be said to have come of it. 
Liu, for one, is glad that the various deprivations of the Cultural Revolution had the 
side effect of making the cinema a central part of children’s lives. “This is solid 
evidence of a good thing coming out of a bad thing,” he writes.86 Wang Meng, 
meanwhile, strikes a more serious note in finding meaning in the experience of past 
events that makes the agony they entailed worthwhile. Taking the long perspective, 
he sublimates the trauma and suffering of the Communist and Cultural Revolution 
into the honor of being a witness to a fragment of China’s history. He writes: 
 
Everyone who survived the disaster of Lin Biao and the “Gang of 
Four” is a fortunate person, and we will live our lives without regret. 
Because in 1949 we had already taken to the streets to celebrate the 
collapse of the Chiang [Kai-shek] family empire, and in 1976 we took 
to the streets again to celebrate the demise of Wang, Zhang, Jiang and 
Yao. How many instances of such fortune can there be in history, 
which allows a single generation to experience the unrestrained 
pleasure of shattering the chains that bind them twice?87
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Of course, these attitudes of looking back on the past without regret can only be 
adopted if the resultant present is considered better than that past. And indeed, a 
narrative of upward progress is precisely what the bestselling historical narrative 
traces between the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution and the introduction of 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. If the Cultural Revolution was a historically 
anomalous perversion, then coming immediately after the fall of the “Gang of Four” 
ended it, Deng’s reforms are the joyous return of China to a state of normalcy and its 
proper historical path. Indeed, the end of the Cultural Revolution and the onset of 
economic reform are often narrated as simultaneous occurrences or even as two sides 
of a single event, as though the one necessarily begot the other. Wang Meng, for 
instance, states that “after the spring thunder of the shattering of the ‘Gang of Four,’ 
Deng’s tenet that ‘practical experience is the only measure for determining the truth’ 
was the spring breeze that blew across the land.”88 Describing the effect of Deng’s 
leadership up till 1984, Robert Kuhn writes, “Under Deng’s efforts, China finally 
emerged from the long shadow of the ‘Cultural Revolution’.”89 Linking the two 
developments so inseparably establishes both a heightened contrast and a logical 
continuity between the irrationality and suffering of the previous chapter and the 
sound rationality and relief of the next.  
 
Rather than a complete break or turnabout from the Communist political economics 
of the PRC’s early decades, Deng’s market economic policies are in this way 
presented as the logical continuation and improved development of original CCP 
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ideology. “Seeking the truth from facts” (shishi qiushi实事求是 ), the “four 
modernizations” (sige xiandaihua四个现代化 ) and “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” (Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi中国特色社会主义) are not betrayals of 
Communist revolutionary beliefs. Rather, after the utter chaos of the Cultural 
Revolution sidetracked China’s development for ten years, they mark the return of 
China to the proper path of progress. After its internecine madness, they mark the 
resumption of the national endeavor in the new wisdom of lessons learnt from the 
Cultural Revolution about the dire danger of naïve political passions. Although they 
take a new approach, Deng’s policies aim towards the same end as the original 
Communist revolutionary movement did – that is, the pursuit of China’s best interests. 
Market reform as Wang Meng sees it is therefore the goal that “the current generation 
has an obligation to achieve, so as to present it as offering to their [revolutionary] 
elders and comrades, who did not live to see it but who have yet to close their eyes in 
the netherworld.”90  
 
A lineage of progressive improvement can thus be traced from the policies and 
regimes of Mao, to those of Deng, to those of Jiang. Wang Meng considers Maoism, 
Deng Xiaoping thought, the “Three Represents” (sange daibiao三个代表) and the 
history of China’s  development all as evidence of the government’s successful 
development of Socialist China, and its keeping abreast of changing times and 
theories.91  In his biography of Jiang, Robert Kuhn too describes Jiang’s ‘Three 
Represents’ as the modernization of CCP ideology, built upon the foundation of Mao 
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and Deng’s thought and signaling their further development.92 Through his reforms, 
Jiang carries on the project of China’s betterment that Mao initiated but lost track of, 
and which Deng began to set back on track. Like Deng, Jiang is praised for “enabling 
China to become a normal country today,”93 and “after decades of humiliation, to step 
back on to the path of renewal.”94
 
Even where the clarion call to Marxism has been dropped then, a linear path of 
progress can still be traced from the early revolutionary days to the present. The total 
chaos wrecked by political fervor in the Cultural Revolution provides the hinge that 
both separates and connects Mao’s heavily ideological and propagandistic approach 
on the one hand, to Deng and Jiang’s pragmatic, economy-oriented approach on the 
other. Having learnt that political passions are destructive, the best-selling narrative 
suggests, China’s leadership has adjusted its approach to focus on real economic 
development instead. This approach is different from the CCP’s earlier ones, because 
it has learnt the lessons of past mistakes and built upon this hard-won wisdom. 
Despite the apparent disjuncture between Mao’s communism and Jiang’s market 
economics, therefore, the three PRC leaders and their ideas are connected by a single 
grand narrative of China’s continuous progress and improvement.95 Looking back on 
China’s development, Wang Meng can thus remark, “It’s a good thing China has 
                                                 
92 Kuhn, Ta gaibianle zhongguo, p. 333, 338 and 455. 
93 Ibid., p. 460. 
94 Ibid., p. 469. 
95 Ibid., p. 457. 
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developed quite well since [the revolutionary old guard] passed on. They must be 
feeling quite content and gratified in the afterworld.”96
 
The Present as the Best Time Ever 
 
In the bestselling historical narrative of the Chinese nation, the newfound comforts of 
economic development since the 1980s are thus portrayed as the happy product of a 
new and hard-won national outlook. This is one that focuses on economics rather than 
politics, is rational rather than possessed, sensible rather than idealistic, mature rather 
than naïve and consequently productive rather than destructive. Manifest in a variety 
of ways, this change from the old way of thinking finally makes possible an 
intelligently practical mode of operation that could never have been realized in the 
past. Framed as an awakening to the need to place real, material concerns above 
hollow ideology and stagnant protocol, it is a revelation that makes the present the 
best time to be alive in the history of the PRC to date. 
 
As one who has come over to this new reality from the early revolutionary days, 
Wang Meng, for example, now realizes that not discussing political directions at all 
can be better than having massive debates about it. Looking back on the days of being 
fervently anti-left, anti-right, anti-this that or the other, he feels only a sense of fatigue 
and futility.97 Instead, Wang considers the present a time to wake up from dreams to 
                                                 
96 Wang, Bucheng yangzi, p. 234. 
97 Ibid., p. 104. 
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reality, and adopt “real results as the only criterion of evaluation.”98 The Marxist 
theorists of yesteryear were noble in their intentions, but history has proven that 
theory alone is not enough.99 In the face of a rapidly changing reality, theoreticians 
who were once high idealists cannot but feel the challenge.100 Rather than high-flown 
ideals, a “basic, healthy rationality [must be] allowed to prevail. Life – especially the 
economic life and ordinary common sense of the masses – will then be naturally 
constructive.”101 While it may have been necessary for the CCP to be idealistic or 
even utopian when it was an insurgent revolutionary party therefore, as the central 
government “it is absolutely essential that it become single-mindedly realistic and 
practical.”102 Praising the current government line that has adopted just such an 
approach, Wang Meng offers his hearty endorsement in the tenor of Deng’s reformist 
rhetoric: 
 
Enlightened people reject the practice of calling a deer a horse, staring 
at a plum to quench ones thirst, or drawing a bun to alleviate ones 
hunger. Enlightened people reject using emotions, especially extreme 
and so-called noble emotions, as a substitute for reality, logic and 
common sense. Enlightened people certainly would not consider 
socialist grass better than capitalist seedling, because the more 
enlightened one is, the more one understands the necessity of rice.103
                                                 
98 Ibid., p. 105. 
99 Ibid., p. 107. 
100 Ibid., p. 106. 
101 Ibid., p. 99. 
102 Ibid., p. 106. 
103 Ibid., p. 164. 
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Carrying on the work where Deng left off, Jiang Zemin is presented as the very 
embodiment of rationality that promises to modernize the Party and bring to China 
the political stability that it needs for economic development. From his tough stance 
against the expression of political dissent to his refusal to allow high-technology 
industries to become state-owned monopolies, Jiang’s policies are portrayed as the 
most sensibly pragmatic strategies for optimizing the nation’s resources. “The most 
appropriate title for Jiang Zeming,” Kuhn quotes Frederick Teiwes in declaring, “is 
‘the CEO of contemporary China.’”104  
 
The CEO of Lenovo, Liu Chuanzhi is then a model beneficiary of China’s sensible 
new outlook. For him, the conviction and courage to put business before government 
and enterprise before bureaucracy is a vital key to both his and China’s current and 
future success. Government organizations are recognized as being bad for business, 
obstructing market efficiency and discouraging the rise of small but competitive new 
companies.105 In the overly politicized state of the past, government boards were 
propped up at the expense of economic development, by an unquestioning faith in 
ideology. Today, however, Liu does not hesitate to tell Premier Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) 
that the greatest threat to all entrepreneurs is the “government risk factor”– that is, the 
opacity and erratic changes of the political bureaucracy.106 When Zhu announced in 
1998 that the government is determined to streamline its operations for greater 
efficiency and use scientific rationality to raise China to greater heights, “all of China 
                                                 
104 Kuhn, Tagaibianle zhongguo, p. 464. 
105 Ling, Lianxiang fengyun, p. 93. 
106 Ibid., pp. 170-173 and p. 284. 
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was inspired to head into the future undaunted.”107 In the current era of China’s rapid 
technological, industrial and economic rise, it is thus an economic rationality 
unfettered by political theory that is cast in the leading role.  
 
While Yao Ming’s success is less directly tied to China’s economic reforms, it too is 
presented as a story that would not have been possible without China’s new openness 
to global exchange and opportunities. Yao Ming’s success thus gives secretary of the 
Chinese Basketball Association Li Yuanwei (李元伟) confidence that even the future 
of Chinese basketball will be characterized by “a more balanced way of 
thinking…We will no longer adopt the perspectives of before and place the nation 
above all else, but rather will also consider the benefit to the individual player and to 
the sports industry.108  
 
In the narrative of progress that is traced, the present thus emerges as the most 
sensible and consequently the best era in the history of the PRC to date. Economics 
has finally replaced politics as the primary focal point of the nation’s efforts. At last, 
people are free to improve and prosper to the best of their natural abilities. This is the 
sentiment that, albeit in different forms, is expressed or implied in all six bestselling 
books. Yao Ming, for one, is grateful to be spared the “inconceivably” dire conditions 
of basketball playing in the 1960s and a “past [that] sounds terribly frightful.”109 
Whether or not he has become too much of an entrepreneur, Yao’s father declares, he 
is pleased because “no matter what, times have changed, times are good now and I 
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108 Yao, Wode shijie, p. 243． 
109 Ibid., p. 36. and 240. 
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am very proud of Yao Ming.”110 For Liu Chuanzhi, success possible in the post-Deng 
China of today only because it is thankfully characterized by a real openness to the 
outside world,111 a competitive market that is unruly but teeming with opportunity112 
and a sensible new focus on scientific development over politics. 113  Even Liu 
Yangdong – who laments the replacement of Beijing’s dear old buildings by ugly 
new ones, and the sudden proliferation of dirty streets and cars everywhere – 
recognizes that those who champion the overriding need for change are not being 
unreasonable.114
 
Envious of the generation that will lead China into the future, Wang Meng 
summarizes this history of the nation through the analogy of a cow that has been 
entangled in ropes and struggling to break free. “Now it has, and finally walks freely 
in a moonlit breeze.”115 Also of his generation, Yang Jiang has a more pessimistic 
attitude but one that is also premised on an underlying belief in the present as the best 
time in history. Yang’s lament is that she will miss out on its comforts because while 
things have finally turned good in the present, the present comes too late for her and 
her family to enjoy it. For them, life finally stabilized in the mid-1980s after what felt 
like a long and difficult hike through the previous few decades.116 “After a life of 
tumult, it was only in our sunset years that we finally had a place to safely settle. But 
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illness and age catch up, and we had already come to the end of our lives’ 
journeys.”117  
 
Perhaps the most emphatic proponent of this progressivist view of China’s history 
however, is Robert Kuhn, who euphorically enumerates the many ways in which 
China is better off now than it ever has been. Under Jiang and subsequently Hu Jintao, 
China has become economically more open, politically healthier, is rapidly 
developing and quickly winning respect in the international arena. Poverty and 
illiteracy are at an all time low, society is stable and standards of living are going 
up.118 Social and economic freedoms have expanded, and “Chinese people today have 
more personal freedoms than they have ever had at any time in history.”119 When 
Jiang looks back at China’s recent history, he sees only suffering and humiliation. 
Kuhn argues that it is in fact thanks to Jiang that China has now finally broken free 
from these conditions. “For the first time in several decades, and possibly for the first 
time in history, China can enter a new era full of confidence and optimism.”120 In this 
China that Jiang has created, Kuhn declares, “no one would be willing to return to the 
past.”121  
 
The meta-narrative of China’s national history, within which context the histories of 
individual Chinese lives are invariably set, is thus one of improvement and progress 
that privileges the present as the best situation to have been achieved to date and that 
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which holds the most promise for a better future. This narrative is favorable to the 
interests of the state as it credits the current Party government with leading the nation 
towards greatness and thereby discourages challenges to its rule.122 Yet this history is 
not one that is simply dictated by the state and disseminated to the masses from the 
top down, but one that enjoys a large measure of popularity in a free consumer book 
market. Indeed, the high level of prevalence that this bestselling historical narrative of 
the nation has been able to achieve is partly the attributable to a market-wide trend in 
recent years of growth in both the demand for and supply of books relating to Chinese 
history. Publishing journals and newspaper reports note the increasing frequency with 
which books relating to Chinese history are making it on to the bestseller charts.123 
One even playfully announces that there have been so many bestselling history books 
of late that it is beginning to seem as though the only people writing bestsellers 
anymore are historians.124 Prevailing conceptions of and attitudes towards history that 
inform this consumer trend furnish the context within which the bestselling historical 
narrative of the nation is produced and consumed. Examining some general 
characteristics of the consumption of history in contemporary urban China will thus 
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CHAPTER 5:  
THE AESTHETICS OF POPULAR HISTORY 
 
The Rhetoric of History 
 
In the Chinese language, ‘history’ or lishi (历史) is an umbrella term for a host of 
more specific subgenres of history – including zhengshi (正史), orthodox or official 
history; yeshi (野史), ‘wild’ or bottom-up history from the field; dangshi (党史), 
party history; and minshi (民史), folk or people’s history. Having to serve as the 
overarching, collective term for this entire array of histories whose methods, values 
and built-in agendas are widely varied if not directly opposed, makes lishi an 
inherently ambiguous term.  
 
Zhang Yingjin has suggested that ‘history’ in Chinese discourse functions as a moral 
obligation or imperative, “a transcendental concept, always eloquently articulated but 
never fully defined.”1 Indeed, newspaper and magazine reviews of biographies and 
memoirs are often generously seasoned with pithy statements expounding upon the 
great value of history, while leaving the term itself an open ended question. History is 
said, for example, to be the “ultimate form of edification in life,”2 “most valuable for 
its transmission of knowledge, culture and learning.”3 “The study of history has an 
everlasting impact on the individual, as it enables him to know himself, edify himself, 
                                                        
1 Zhang Yingjin, “Narrative, Ideology, Subjectivity: Defining a Subversive Discourse in Chinese Reportage,” in 
Politics, Ideology and Literary Discourse in Modern China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique, ed. 
Liu Kang and Xiaobing Tang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 234.
2 Jiang Wei 蒋巍, “Rang lishi jizhu yanlei” 让历史记住眼泪 (Let History Remember the Tears), Zhongguo 
chuban中国出版 (China Publishing) Vol. 2004.7 (July 2004), p. 62. 
3 Yan Chongnian 阎崇年, “Zhengshuo, xishuo, tongshuo, xinshuo” 正说 细说 通说 新说 (Treatieses, Details, 
General Histories and New Approaches), Beijing wanbao 北京晚报 (Beijing Evening News), 10 January 2005. 
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and finally to perfect himself.”4  History is the “best standard against which the 
present should be critiqued and judged,”5 and “the source of values along which the 
present should be corrected.”6 One author even goes so far as to declare history 
“China’s religion,” and “the Chinese people’s encyclopedia for life.”7
 
Coupled with this sense of history’s immense value, one also finds a rhetoric of truth 
and accuracy (zhenshi 真实), based on the assumption that the material reality of 
historical fact can be directly transposed into and recorded as written historical 
narrative. The truth is thus frequently invoked as the moral imperative towards which 
writers of history have a fundamental duty. Their responsibility to their readers is 
defined as “properly describing true historical figures and true historical events.”8 
Books are praised for “returning history its original appearance,”9 for example, and 
“letting historical reality speak for itself, rather than manipulating it in the interests of 
the powerful.”10  
 
Further adding a sense of urgency to the task of true historical representation, one 
then finds a prevalent anxiety over the possibility of collective amnesia. The sense 
                                                        
4 Yu Sheng余升, “Kanguo diyu deren kan lishi” 看过地狱的人看历史 (History Through the Eyes of One Who 
Has Seen Hell), Chubanren出版人 (Publishers), Vol.22 (2005), p. 56. 
5 Suo Si, “Huajian yihujiu.” 
6 Zhen Yong郑勇, “Huajian yihujiu” 花间一壶酒 (Wine Amidst the Flowers), Shucheng 书城 (Book City) Vol. 
2005.8 (August 2005), p. 78. To use the past to criticize the present (jiegu fengjin借古讽今) is a staple approach to 
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7 Yu, “Kanguo diyu deren.” 
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9 Ibid. See also Jia Jia贾葭, “Liejiu laosao” 烈酒牢骚 (Grumblings from Strong Wine), Liaowang dongfang 
zhoukan廖王东方周刊 (Oriental Outlook), Vol. 2005.9 (September 9, 2005), p. 75. 
10 Liu Suli刘苏里, “Shanyu yulai fengmanlou” 山雨欲来风满楼 (Wing Before the Mountain Storms), Chubanren
出版人 (Publishers), Vol. 2005.19 (2005), p. 59. 
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that the Chinese people have been too quick to forget their past11 yields frequent calls 
against covering up, neglecting and otherwise forgetting history. 12  The younger 
generations in particular, having never experienced the Mao era, are seen as prone to 
abandoning the burden of China’s history altogether.13 Seen as valuable efforts to 
thwart this trend, biographies and memoirs are thus commonly praised for rescuing 
knowledge from vanishing into the oblivion of collective forgetfulness. Wang Meng’s 
memoirs are praised for offering us access into a world that “is about to be 
forgotten,”14 for instance, and Hongdijinzi for documenting icons of the Cultural 
Revolution that are quickly being forgotten in the present. 15  The obligation to 
remember, the edifying value of history and the imperative of historical truth are thus 
three common conceptions that form the rhetorical context within which historical 
writings are situated.  
 
An influential determinant of popular attitudes towards history, this rhetoric is itself 
shaped by past and present factors of the state, the market and the people. The moral 
obligation towards historical truth, for example, exists in relation to perceived 
instances of willful misrepresentation. Perry Link traces a widespread “thirst among 
the reading public for truth telling”16  to the split that occurred between theoretical 
truth and material truth in the 1950s, when agricultural collectivization projects 
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12 Ibid. 
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resulted in famine and poverty spreading side by side with state reports of astounding 
success and bountiful bumper harvests.17 During the Maoist rhetoric-laden period of 
the Cultural Revolution, this divergence developed into a system of “institutionalized 
hypocrisy,” in which public role-playing involved a mode of official discourse that 
often ran directly counter to opinions expressed in the private realm.18 The easing of 
censorship regulations since the end of the Cultural Revolution has delivered many 
works on topics formerly proscribed by the state to a wide and eager audience.  
 
The new book publishing industry that has developed since, however, presents its 
own threat to historical truth in the form of commercial corruption. Geremie Barmé 
notes the proliferation of historical writings that occurred from the early 1980s, when 
“the publication of historical revelations and scandal [proved] most profitable.”19 
Functioning as agents of the market, individuals engaged in paid reportage, 
irresponsibly trashy writing and other unconscionably profit-dictated activities are 
seen as misrepresenting history for their own gains, and trading in untruths against 
which the people should be on guard. Indeed, the prevalence of such perceptions is 
what makes it necessary for Ling Zhijun, for instance, to repeatedly explain his 
relationship to Lenovo and its CEO. In multiple interviews, Ling states emphatically:  
 
[that he made it his] top priority to maintain an objective and 
independent perspective; that every sentence he wrote he had thought 
of himself and that he had not written anything he did not want to; that 
                                                        
17 Ibid., p. 272. 
18 Ibid., p. 274-275. 
19 Geremie Barmé, “History for the Masses,” in Using the Past to Serve the Present, ed. Jonathan Unger (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), pp. 266-267. 
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no one from the company had requested he say or not say anything; 
that he had not received a single cent or gift from the company, and 
that he can thus say, with confidence, that he has not been anybody’s 
mouthpiece.20
 
Warnings against the dangers of collective amnesia too are loaded with implications 
against the state and market. The Deng-era state’s efforts to encourage people to 
simply forget about the Cultural Revolution and move on, for example, have long 
been the target of calls for the ‘right to remember.’ Deng Xiaoping’s insistence in 
1976 that “it is impossible and unnecessary for [many questions] to be resolved to our 
complete satisfaction… [that] it is impossible to clear up every little detail, and 
unnecessary,” has thus only generated more calls for the reassessment of political and 
literary figures since. 21  As economic development engenders new lifestyles and 
priorities that are radically different from those of the past, the market economy and 
its social and cultural corollaries have also come to be seen as forces of amnesia, 
particularly for members of the younger generations who know only the present 
reality. 
 
From this perspective, the call to history appears to come from the people, against the 
interests of both the state and the market. Yet the state and market make their own 
claims to history too and often do so in purposeful accordance with the claims of the 
people. Indeed, it is not actually the people but the agents of the market that have 
                                                        
20 Lei, “‘Wo bushi renheren de qiangshou,’” p. 15. 
21 Barmé, “History for the Masses,” p. 262-265. 
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played the most active role in bringing about the increase in writings related to 
Chinese history. Through the aggressive production and promotion of books, movies 
and television shows on Chinese history, media enterprises have created a lucrative 
industry for themselves in recent years. Although the rhetoric of history is articulated 
in the voice of the people, it is thus the market that most actively circulates, promotes 
and profits from it.22 The rhetoric of history then functions as an advertisement for the 
products that the market is pushing. In newspaper and magazine reviews, it describes 
a pressing need for historical truth that the book under review just so happens to 
provide. Reviews of memoirs invoke the perils of Chinese amnesia, for instance, as 
the grave and imminent threat from which this or that individual’s recollections can 
happily save you. Ling Zhijun’s self-righteous and loudly proclaimed stance against 
profit-driven history writing, meanwhile, is itself a strategy for marketing his own 
book.  
 
The state, meanwhile, fuels burgeoning calls for history in order to promote its own 
favored narratives. In an effort to minimize the potentially destabilizing effects of 
reckless profit-driven publishing, for example, the GAPP sends out calls for the 
strengthening of editorial values and a return to the traditional view of literature as a 
form of spiritual and moral edification.23 These cues are picked up and echoed as 
impassioned pleas and laments over the current state of popular culture, in the 
editorials of major newspapers and magazines over which the state has a high degree 
of influence. In their reviews of biographies and memoirs from state-run presses, such 
                                                        
22 Chen, Zhongguo zhuanji, p. 487. 
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newspapers also tailor the rhetoric of history to promote both the books in question 
and the state-sanctioned ideological orientations that they carry. The drive to produce 
‘edifying,’ ‘true’ and ‘urgently needed’ Chinese histories thus comes not only from 
the people, but from the state and the market as well.  
 
Loaded with this range of meanings, imperatives and allegiances, ‘history’ appears to 
function in the popular realm more as an attitude or disposition than as a 
methodologically defined discipline. The term expresses an effort to identify values in 
the past that might lend the authority of experience and the gravity of a collective 
heritage, to convictions and interests in the present.24 In their use of this tool, the 
agents and agendas of the state, the market and the people are inseparably entwined. 
The popular rhetoric of history and the bestselling narratives it promotes are 
platforms for all of their tendentious representations of the nation’s past. While this 
may be true of all histories to a certain extent, several characteristics that are 
culturally specific to Chinese narratives seem to make them especially pliable for this 
purpose. 
 
Objectivity and Subjectivity 
 
One such characteristic is the basis of Chinese historical narratives in a set of 
standards that values both historiographic as well as literary qualities, seeing them not 
as contradictory or mutually exclusive values but as features that often come together. 
                                                        
24 For further discussion on presentism, the “normative imperative” and “moral aesthetics of history,” see On-cho 
Ng and Q. Edward Wang, Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in Imperial China (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2005), pp. 234-235. 
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This amorphous boundary between history and literary fiction can be traced back to 
early traditional Chinese historiography and bespeaks a different approach to issues of 
subjectivity and objectivity than is characteristic of Western historical traditions. 
Fiction first emerged in Han dynasty China (206 BCE – 220 CE) as a form of 
“defective history,” designating records of less important and sometimes less 
verifiable subject matter than was worthy of inclusion in official or standard 
histories.25 Historiography and fiction became the two major forms of narrative, but 
such a high level of exchange continued between the two that contemporary 
historians find “it is quite impossible to draw a definitive boundary at any point… 
between what is clearly historical and what is clearly fictional.” 26  Traditional 
bibliographical groupings “cut rather freely across the lines of fiction and history,” 
such that one can only speak of “the history-fiction spectrum” or “narrative 
continuum from history to fiction.”27  
 
Traditional Chinese works of history are thus strongly characterized by and valued for 
the literary qualities that they posses. Written by Sima Tan (司马谈 d. 110 BCE) and 
his son Sima Qian (司马迁 145-86 BCE), both Prefect Grand Historians of the Han 
dynasty, the Shiji (史记) set the standard against which future Chinese historical 
narratives would be measured. Its most prominent and celebrated features, for 
example, include: 
                                                        
25 Stephen Durrant, “The Literary Feastures of Historical Writing,” in The Columbia History of Chinese Literature, 
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…first, the complexity and density of [Sima Qian’s] characters; second, 
the liveliness of both the narration and quoted discourse; and third, the 
powerful emotional reactions of the historian [Sima Qian] himself, 
which fashion him into a compelling and interesting character in his 
own text.28
 
Although a historical work, the Shiji also drew from many sources of dubious factual 
credibility and included content that “must [have been] fabricated,” such as private 
dialogues and details that would have been impossible to know. 29  Similarly, 
examining the canonized official history of the Ming dynasty, literary historian 
Andrew Plaks notes that “even such a weighty opus as the Mingshi (明史) is replete 
with fictional elements.”30  
 
Rather than striving to achieve a rigorous separation of the two, a “complementary 
relation between truth and fabrication [is thus discernible] in Chinese narrative 
theory.”31 From as early as the Han dynasty, one major realm of this intermingling has 
been biographies in particular, or what historian Stephen Durrant refers to as the 
“large world of Chinese biography occupying a murky realm between history and 
fiction.” 32  Traced back to the Shiji, this genre of liezhuan (列传 ) is generally 
                                                        
28 Durrant, “The Literary Features,” p. 503. 
29 Ibid., p. 505. 
30 Plaks, “Towards a Critical Theory,” p. 312. 
31 Ibid., p. 317. 
32 Durrant, “The Literary Qualities,” p. 508. Another major arena is the genre of historical fiction. For a discussion 
of traditional historical fiction, see Shelley Hsueh-lun Chang, History and Legend: Ideas and Images in the Ming 
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translated as ‘memoirs’ or ‘biographies.’33 Through their combination of vivid and 
often entertaining anecdotes about their subjects’ personalities with the standardized 
reliability of chronological annals, William Nienhauser finds these “biographies 
helped to shape both ‘fiction’ and ‘history’ and also served as a bridge across which 
these two narrative forms were able to influence each other.”34  
 
Modernity and nation-state formation have, of course, fundamentally changed both 
Chinese historiography and fiction in ways that it is not within the scope of this study 
to examine.35 Retained and developed over centuries, however, these deep narrative 
traditions nevertheless constitute a foundational segment of the lineage of what 
Geremie Barmé identifies in its contemporary form as “faction [factual fiction].”36 As 
discussed in Chapter Two, biographies and memoirs are commonly understood in 
contemporary urban China as a subgenre of history writing that is heavily influenced 
by fictional literature. Like history, biographies and memoirs are defined by the 
criterion of truth; but like literature, they narrate stories and in doing so strive towards 
the aesthetic values of genuineness, goodness and beauty (zhen, shan, mei 真、善、
美).37 Despite having objective historical accuracy as a central key to their legitimacy, 
they also feature ample room for the creative play and subjective expressiveness of 
fictional literature. This makes them the “precious fruit of the culmination of history 
                                                        
33 William H. Nienhauser, Jr., “Early Biography,” in The Columbia History of Chinese Literature, ed. Victor H. 
Mair (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 514. 
34 Ibid., p. 511-516. 
35 For a brief discussion of modern Chinese historiography in comparative relation to historiography from the 
imperial period, see Ng and Wang, Mirroring the Past, p. 263; For a more thorough discussion of changes in 
Chinese historiography over the twentieth century, see Q. Edward Wang, Inventing China Through History: The 
May Fourth Approach to Historiography (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001). 
36 Barmé, “History for the Masses,” p. 270. The term is introduced in this study in Chapter 2, p. 12. 
37 Zhu, Zhuanji tonglun, p. 60. 
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and literature.”38 A work whose strength is seen to lie precisely in this fusion of 
genres, Womensa is thus described as drawing from memories and reflections, dreams 
and reality, stream of consciousness and documentary-style writing, to construct a 
“novel-styled essay, or a dynamic novel” that is at the same time a “most reliable 
historical document.” 39  Other bestselling biographies are similarly praised for 
respecting both historical and artistic realities, incorporating both historical 
truthfulness and artistic truthfulness, and for achieving an optimal fusion of the two.40  
 
Even more than in other forms of contemporary popular history then, narratives in 
bestselling biographies and memoirs tend strongly towards the fusion of historical 
and literary methods and principles. Dramatization, exaggeration for effect and 
reasonable speculation are not considered instances of falsification, but rather are 
seen as accurately reflecting the author’s personal experience.41 These narratives are 
thus able to provide reconstructions of history embellished by the literary devices of 
fiction. In addition to providing historical information, Womensa is thus celebrated for 
its “sweet and beautiful” recollections and “emotive outpourings on tales of tears and 
blood,”42 while Hongdijinzi is commended for the “simultaneously heartening and 
saddening” message that it carries.43 Other memoirs are praised for reconstructing 
history by describing the “intense emotional experience of struggling to survive with 
                                                        
38 Ibid., p. 222. 
39 Yu Zhan舒展, “Guyidaoshang wudaozhe – du yangjiang xinzuo ‘womensa.’” 古驿道上悟道者-读杨绛新作
《我们仨》(Reading Yang Jiang’s ‘Us Three’), <http://www.jcrb.com/zyw/n247/ca245911.htm>. Date accessed: 
15 April 2006.  
40 Wang, “Shichang, p. 14.  
41 Zhu, Zhuanji tonglun, p. 230. 
42 Yu, “Guyidaoshang.” 
43 Huang Jiwei黄集伟, “Rengran shaxiao, danshi huode” 仍然渺小，但是活的 (Still Small But Living), Beijing 
qingnianbao北京青年报 (Beijing Youth Newspaper), 24 March 2005. 
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graphic characterizations that will move readers to sigh;”44 or preserving historical 
knowledge by telling “very moving, exceptionally profound and expressive stories.”45  
 
As a vehicle for historical narratives, biographies and memoirs thus operate from 
their position in between history and literature. Authors of these works achieve their 
effect by combining the strengths of both genres – “the freedom to invent and 
generalize from [fiction]; and the prestige of truthfulness, the actuality, and the wide 
distribution from [history or journalism].”46 Western academic sensibilities may find 
it problematic to use such writing as a source of historical knowledge. Chinese 
popular history, however, accepts and indeed appreciates this smudging of boundaries 
between the supposedly opposite qualities of objectivity and subjectivity. 
 
This approach to historical authority and veracity does not entail a blanket acceptance 
of any narrative that claims to be history. The fundamental subjectivity of an 
individual’s experience and subsequent account of events is recognized as a potential 
obstacle to historical objectivity as clearly in popular Chinese historiography as in its 
Western equivalent. There is acknowledgement of and an effort to minimize, for 
example, “common sources of error – poor situation, distraction, or inattention of the 
observer; confusion, delay, reliance on indirect information, or perfunctoriness, in 
preparation of [the historian’s] written report.”47 Memories are seen as the result of a 
                                                        
44 Zhang Hong 张弘, “Yi jiyi queding xianzai” 以记忆确定现在 (Using Memory to Ascertain the Present), 
Beijing wanbao北京晚报 (Beijing Evening News), 5 September 2004. 
45 Zhang Yiwu张颐武, “Shidai de ceying” 时代的侧影 (Profile of the Times), Shuzai书摘 (Selections), Vol. 
2005.6 (June 2005), p. 119. 
46 Zhang, “Narrative, Ideology, Subjectivity,” p. 216. 
47 Charles S. Gardner, Chinese Traditional Historiography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 
67. 
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selective process of retaining and forgetting, such that while many people may 
experience the same historical event, every person’s account of it will necessarily 
differ.48  
 
Rather than make the writing of history impossible, however, in the practice of 
popular history, this condition merely makes it more difficult. Individual subjectivity 
is not seen as an insurmountable obstacle to the accurate representation of history, but 
as an inescapable fact which simply means that more is dependent upon the author’s 
intentions. Indeed, the author has been considered the central determinant of a 
historical work’s value from China’s early imperial period, in which the role of 
history and the “historian-narrator” was as the final judge and keeper of moral 
standards.49 Events in traditional historiography were deemed “worthy of literary 
representation for their exemplary value, not in their own right… Historians thus 
owed their fidelity first to an ethical, discursive truth and only secondarily to the 
reality of the particular events they recorded.”50 Increasing skepticism and the close 
concern with factual veracity that characterized late imperial historiography served 
only to heighten the centrality of the author’s character and intentions, as “the felicity 
of praise and blame depended [even more] heavily on the historian’s cautious, 
judicious assessment.”51  
 
                                                        
48 Zhang, “Yi jiyi queding xianzai.”  
49 Durrant, “The Literary Qualities,” pp. 496-498. 
50 Anderson, The Limits of Reality, p. 22. For a full discussion of the historian’s intentions and methods in early 
traditional Han dyanasty historiography, see Stephen Durrant’s analysis of Sima Qian as the “Idealogue vs 
Narrator” of the Shiji, in Stephen Durrant, The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings of Sima Qian 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1995), pp. 123-144. 
51 Ng and Wang, Mirroring the Past, p. 228. 
 130
Informed by this narrative tradition among other factors, contemporary reviews of 
popular biographies and memoirs also ascribe primary importance to their author’s 
motives. If an author writes only in order to present himself favorably, equivocating 
and evading the less flattering aspects of his life, for instance, then the truthfulness of 
his narrative is cast in doubt, and its historical value can only be severely limited. 52 If 
he “faces the past with an open mind [and] the courage and determination to judge 
himself with merciless impartiality” however, his recollections will constitute 
historical truths and “present the past in its original image.”53
 
In place of a Rankean objectivity criterion then, the standard most rigorously applied 
in contemporary Chinese popular history is what Charles Laughlin has usefully 
identified as “authenticity, although this authenticity is not the actuality of history but 
the authenticity of personal sincerity.”54 If a writer is sincere in his intentions for 
entering his personal experience into the collective historical record, then while the 
account that he provides will inevitably be subjective, it will nevertheless constitute a 
genuine record of an experience of history. Much like a work of literature, a sincerely 
penned narrative of the subjective experience of a historical event is seen as having 
documentary value for the larger collective. Wang Meng’s emotional reflections and 
factual statements thus complement rather than contradict each other, and constitute a 
valuable historical document because he uses them both only to “speak honestly.”55 
Another author’s sincerity makes his personal notes and diaries a “genuine historical 
                                                        
52 Zhang, “Yi jiyi queding xianzai.” 
53 Ibid. 
54 Laughlin, Chinese Reportage, p. 279. 
55 Tao Lan陶澜, “Xishu wentan sanshiren jiushi jiushi” 细述文坛三十人旧时旧事 (Thirty Literary Peoples’ Pasts) 
Beijing qingnianbao北京青年报 (Beijing Youth Newspaper), 12 May 2005. 
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record.”56 The memoirs of yet another are accorded historical value because she has 
avoided being “pretentious or artificial” in writing them.57 Thus it is not objectivity 
but the authenticity of personal sincerity that legitimizes a writer’s account of events, 





Attendant to the notion of authenticity is the Chinese literary practice of collective 
subjectivity. This is the technique of writing from a perspective that belongs not to the 
writer as an individual but to the subjectivity of a broader collective identity, often 
that of the society or nation. The narrative voice of the text then belongs equally and 
at the same time to both reader and writer, and readers enter the text “not as an 
individual member of a group but [under] the subjective assumption of an identity 
that is fundamentally collective in nature.”58  
 
An issue central to discussions on the very inception of modernity in China, collective 
subjectivity in Chinese writings is often traced back to the May Fourth Movement as 
the struggle to define a modern national identity through literature. Literary historians 
find in the writings of early twentieth-century intellectuals such as Liang Qichao, Lu 
Xun and Mo Yan the first attempts to articulate a collective, “national subjectivity (of 
                                                        
56 Wu Fei吴菲, “Huawai danqing zhizuo taziji” 画外丹青制作他自己 (Dan Qing’s Self-production), Beijing 
qingnianbao北京青年报 (Beijing Youth Newspaper), 18 November 2004. 
57 Li Feimu李非木, “Zuoren yinggai zhenshi” 做人应该真实 (People Should Be True), Liaowang dongfang 
zhoukan瞭望东方周刊 (Oriental Outlook), Vol. 2005.6 (2 June 2005), p. 77. 
58 Laughlin, Chinese Reportage, p. 265. 
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the Chinese as a new people)” that would therefore constitute China as a new (i.e. 
modern) state.59 Examining Chinese reportage literature from the 1930s, Laughlin 
thus finds that “in all cases, the act of writing itself necessitates the writer’s 
identification with China as a nation or a people…the specific observations, 
experiences, and reflections of these writers become the very fabric of a collective 
consciousness of modern China.”60 During the Mao era that followed, the character of 
this collective subject was occupied by a CCP-designed identity that trumpeted 
revolutionary sacrifice and national salvation.61 Through its brand of socialist realism, 
the Communist ideal of a collective identity and spirit was disseminated in countless 
novels, songs, plays and films that overwhelmingly dominated the realm of popular 
consciousness from the 1950s through 1970s.62
 
Exercised to a maximum and lasting effect in the mobilization of both rural and urban 
masses in that period, some form of a collective, national identity remains until today 
so entrenched that literary historian Liu Kang finds “to speak of identity in modern 
China often entails speaking of China as identity, collectively, in national and cultural 
terms.”63 In the bestselling historical narrative of the nation then, it is this collective 
                                                        
59 Ching-Kiu Stephen Chan, “Split China, or, The Historical/Imaginary: Toward a Theory of the Displacement of 
Subjectivity at the Margins of Modernity” in Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse in Modern China: 
Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique, ed. Liu Kang and Xiaobing Tang (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1993), p. 71; See also Xiaobin Yang, “Whence and Whither the Postmodern/Post-Mao-Deng: Historical 
Subjectivity and Literary Subjectivity in Modern China,” in Postmodernism & China, ed. Arif Dirlik and Zhang 
Xudong (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 379-398. 
60 Ibid., p. 73. 
61 Liu Kang, “Subjectivity, Marxism, and Cultural Theory in China,” in Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse 
in Modern China: Theoretical Interventions and Cultural Critique, ed. Liu Kang and Xiaobing Tang (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1993), p. 30; For an extensive discussion of the CCP’s “appropriation of… collective 
narratorial subjectivity” from 1949 to 1966, see Laughlin, Chinese Reportage, pp. 222-262. 
62 For more on Chinese socialist realism, see Martson Anderson, The Limits of Realism: Chinese Fiction in the 
Revolutionary Period (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); for a history of policy and 
administrative changes in “the public exercise of literature” in the PRC, see Rudolf G. Wagner, Inside a Service 
Trade: Studies of Contemporary Chinese Prose (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
63 Chan, “Split China,” p. 71. 
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subjectivity of reader and writer that makes it possible for the authenticity criterion to 
serve as a functional resolution to the objective-subjective binary. While the writer’s 
account is subjective, it is not with the subjectivity of an individual whose experience 
is limited to his own person, but with the collective subjectivity of the Chinese nation 
as a whole. 
 
Befitting their appeal to this form of their readers’ subjectivity, narratives in 
bestselling biographies and memoirs are often framed as the stories of ordinary 
Chinese people (Zhongguo ren 中国人). Although the subjects of biographies are 
often leading, famous or otherwise exceptional individuals, they are presented as 
being at the same time regular folk whose stories hold historical truths because they 
have had the same experiences as everyone else has had. In interviews, writers speak 
of their desire to write “not just for but as ordinary folk,” and create works that 
“genuinely speak to ordinary readers.”64 One writer’s memoirs thus tell the stories of 
“common folk whose lives have left a historical trail though their names have been 
forgotten.”65 The biography the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Donald Tsang, is just 
“the story of an ordinary person,”66 and Womensa is “not about grand themes,” but 
“merely the life story of a family in the last half century.”67 Hongdijinzi is the 
                                                        
64 Zhou and Sun, “Yuhua de zhengmian qianggong.”  
See also Jie Xizhang解玺璋, “Xueshu xiaotiandi, lishi dayanguang – liling xiansheng fangtanlu” 学术小天地 历
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65 Zhang Yiwu, “Shidai de ceying.” 
66  Xu Feng许锋 , “Yiben putongren de zhuanji” 一本普通人的传记  (An Ordinary Person’s Biography), 
Chubanren  出版人 (Publishers), Vol. 2005.15 (August 2005), p. 51. 
67 Qin Bazi秦巴子, “Shuping ‘womensa’ changxiao, pusu de liliang” 书评：《我们仨》畅销 朴素的力量 (A 
Review of ‘Us Three’), <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenhua/1086/20092011.html>. Date accessed: 15 April 
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“collective memory of the ordinary children of 1960s and 1970s Beijing”68 and any 
Beijing child from that era, it is claimed, will invariably relate to the book because it 
encapsulates “the shared experience of us all, [such that the] you, me and him of that 
era all live on between its covers.”69  
 
The individuals whose stories are told in bestselling biographies and memoirs thus 
represent the larger collective by not only rising above it, but at the same time 
remaining identical to everyone else in it. Each one a variation on the same life story 
of the collective Chinese people, these narratives are microcosms of the history of the 
Chinese nation. Through a family’s gatherings and separations, for instance, Womensa 
“outlines the sufferings and joys, and traces the fading footsteps of a violently 
changing 20th century China.”70 The story of Lenovo, Lianxiang fengyun, is “not that 
of one man but a microcosm of an era in our nation’s history.” 71  “Every 
characteristically Chinese trait of the period is encapsulated in Lenovo, [making its 
story] the history of China since the inception of economic reform.”72 As depicted by 
Robert Kuhn, Jiang Zemin is a virtually living microcosm of contemporary China.73
 
Yet even while the biographical subject’s life is made ordinary or generic so as to 
                                                        
68 Huang, “Rengran shaxiao.” 
69 Xin Jiang辛江, “Du ‘hongdi jinzi – liuqishi niandai de Beijing haizi” 读《红底金字-六七十年代的北京孩
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function as a representative story of the collective Chinese people, the intimate 
activities and personal details of his or her life are not therefore left out. Indeed, such 
information is relished as offering “behind-the-scenes information [that would] 
otherwise be inaccessible,” and thereby constituting valuable “micro-histories.”74 Too 
often overlooked, these micro-histories of personal lives provide humanizing insights 
that bring the past to life. Memoirs such as Wang Meng’s are thus praised for 
including details of his personal social interactions that bring his characters “so 
vividly to life…one can almost hear them breathe and sigh.” 75  Robert Kuhn’s 
biography of Jiang Zemin is commended for amply discussing aspects of his home 
life, avocational hobbies, character and personal style.76 Another biography – of 
Empress Dowager Ci Xi, written by her grandson – became a runaway bestseller on 
its merit as an insider scoop on the “personal heartaches and burdens [that reveal] a 
most real, genuine Empress Dowager, in the flesh and blood and living color.”77  
 
Offering readers access to the juicier parts of Chinese history, the value of personal 
lives as micro-history is articulated against orthodox, official or academic histories 
(zhengshi). Orthodox histories are dismissed as being “desiccated and lifeless,” “dry, 
bland and low on readability.” They are “unable to accommodate vanity, sexuality, 
                                                        
74 Zhang, “Shidai de ceying,” p. 119.  
See also Tao Lan, “Xishu wentan.”  
75 Zhang Yiwu, “Shidai de ceying,” p. 119. 
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courage or change,” and hence “simply incapable of capturing the truth.”78 Whereas 
wilder, unconventional approaches to history are “bold enough to tell things like they 
are, orthodox histories mince their words and obscure reality in the process.” 79  
Histories that are willing to tell the gritty human stories are thus celebrated as being 
richer than their orthodox equivalents, “truer than grand narratives,” and “more 
realistic in their representations of human nature than the lofty pedagogical stuff of 
history proper.”80 The human micro-histories of personal lives capture “the true-blue, 
concrete details that grand narratives miss.”81 They are of “exceptional historical 
value [at least as] rich supplements to the broader narratives of orthodox history,”82 if 
not as “superior alternatives to ordinary histories, which all tell the same boring tale.83  
 
Writing in the voice of a collective national subjectivity thus allows bestselling 
biographies and memoirs to claim to tell stories of ordinary lives on the one hand, 
while also hawking private details and insider information on the other. Written 
always from a perspective that is common to reader, writer and biographical subject, 
each individual’s story can be seen as a scintillating variant of what is ultimately the 
same essential theme, the collective historical experience of the Chinese people. 
Collective subjectivity thus makes possible the recognition of personal stories not as 
minor parts of a broader national history, but as legitimate histories of the nation in 
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and of themselves. As human stories that readers can relate to on a personal level, 
these narratives become a highly accessible medium through which reconstructions of 
the history of the nation are circulated within the realm of Chinese popular culture 
today. 
 
Compared to orthodox and official histories, bestselling biographies and memoirs 
thus do more to meet the current demands of popular history. Commonly seen as a 
subgenre of the discipline, they are able to meet expectations of edifying value, truth 
and salvation from collective amnesia. As stories told by and of individual people, 
they are also well able to resolve the conflict between objectivity and subjectivity 
through the authenticity of the writer’s personal sincerity. This allows them to exploit 
their position between history and fiction to maximum effect in convincing their 
readers. As human stories, biographies and memoirs are furthermore highly accessible 
to a broad audience of readers who can relate these stories directly to their own lives. 
This easy entry into the text is facilitated by the use of the ordinary Chinese person as 
the identity of the collective subject. At the same time proffering access to the 
personal and private lives of famous individuals, biographies and memoirs also 
deliver entertainment content that has a mass appeal. Such ‘insider information’ 
includes accounts by those with the eyewitness authority of direct personal 
participation in past events and eras. The grand historical narrative that furnishes the 
single common backdrop to all these individual stories then constitutes a popular 
history of the Chinese nation. Innocuously circulated as the unspoken assumption 
underlying every Chinese individual’s life story, this broad narrative is a quiet but 
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The bestselling historical narrative of the Chinese nation traces a linear path of 
progress, from destructive political passions in the past to productive economic 
sensibility in the present. The revolutionary spirit and mass movements of the PRC’s 
founding years are sublimated into pure patriotism and idealism. The subsequent 
Cultural Revolution is then represented as a case of this political fervor gone horribly 
awry, and as a period characterized most predominantly by the collective experience 
of material deprivation. By stark contrast to physical suffering from political madness, 
developments following Deng Xiaoping’s marketizing reforms are presented as a 
much desired change. Although it is ushering in new social trends of ambivalent merit, 
the greater material wealth and prosperity that economic development brings are 
undeniably good and desirable. The present is thus depicted as the best time to be 
alive, and indeed as the almost ideal situation that the entire history of the PRC has 
actually been an effort to bring about. 
 
Rather than an about face in ideology and an abandonment of the socialist system, 
China’s current transition towards market economics is presented as its return to the 
rightful path of progress from which it had briefly been derailed. Its new economic 
orientation is the result of the nation having learnt the hard way what damage political 
passions can wreck. Rather than a betrayal of the revolutionary generations’ ideals, 
marketization is thus the continuance of their patriotism and the hard won fruit of 
their sacrifice. Its inception is the restoration of rationality. The operative logarithm 
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of the market system is thus presented not as a specifically capitalist logic but as logic 
itself, to which there is no real alternative. Rather than disjuncture between 
communism and capitalism, that is between one historical possibility and another, this 
narrative thus traces continuity along a single, linear historical teleology.   
 
This construction of the nation’s history suits the interests of the state well. Depicting 
the Cultural Revolution as a historical perversion beyond human agency absolves the 
CPC government of blame for the events of that period. Repeatedly highlighting 
improvements in material living conditions since then further shifts attention away 
from issues of political leadership and accountability. Instead, this approach credits 
the current government with leading the nation out of a generalized chaos and into 
organized economic development and prosperity. It does as Prasenjit Duara says all 
nationalist histories do, and sets up the present as the post-political utopia at the end 
of history.1 Not only does this legitimize the current Party-state as a leader of proven 
capability, it also eliminates the theoretical need for political opposition or any other 
challenge to the status-quo. The current Party-state then emerges as the only, natural 
governing authority, while past, present and future alternatives are obscured. 
 
Favorable as such a narrative of the nation is to the ruling party-state, however, it is 
not merely a history that is dictated by the central government and disseminated to the 
people from the top down. Rather, it is jointly produced by the state, the market and 
the people, because it is well suited to the interests of all three. It suits the interests of 
                                                 
1 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press), p. 4. 
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the market firstly as a commodity for which there is a high demand and in which a 
lucrative trade can thus be conducted. Secondly, it is a narrative that celebrates the 
market system and champions the cause of its further development. Current market 
forces thus produce and circulate this narrative as one that is not only profitable in the 
present, but which also promotes a future that is potentially even more profitable. 
 
The narrative suits the interests of the people by conforming to common conceptions 
of the qualities and functions of history. Meeting their expectations for valuable 
‘truths’ delivered through literature of high aesthetic quality, the bestselling historical 
narrative in its various forms provides a pleasurable experience to the people who 
consume it. In addition to reinforcing prevailing notions of national and generational 
identities, it also constructs and places its readers in an enviable position at the best 
time in history. Such a narrative of progress provides justification for their past 
sufferings, and paints them a future that will be even better. Striking several pleasing 
notes in this way, it sits well with the preferences and appetites of the mass consumer 
audience. 
 
Indeed, it is only by aligning the agendas and agents of the state, the market and the 
people that this narrative of the nation is able to achieve a level of prevalence high 
enough to be considered a popular history. The bestseller is a joint-production by the 
state that sanctions or directly promotes it, the market that advertises and circulates it, 
and the people who widely consume it. Neither entirely disseminated from the top 
down nor entirely percolated from the bottom up, this popular conception of the 
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nation and its history is the combined result of initiatives by people at every level in 
between. Texts that carry its narrative are penned by authors as high up as the former 
Minister of Culture and as ordinary as an anonymous child of 1960s’ Beijing. They 
are edited, produced, distributed and marketed by the massive staff of a network of 
government institutions and commercial enterprises. Their reception is further primed 
by the host of reviewers who write for a wide range of newspapers, magazines and 
journals of varying caliber. Finally and in this context, the texts are actively 
consumed rather than passively received by the purchasing masses of a free retail 
market. Rather than a synonym for the unofficial, underground, marginalized, 
subversive or anti-state therefore, the popular in the context of contemporary China 
must increasingly be seen as the result of collaborative efforts by all three factors of 
the state, the market and the people. 
 
As a nationalist project, the bestselling historical narrative is an instance in which 
state nationalism and cultural nationalism appear to be in accord. It is a broad enough 
narrative to accommodate the interests of both where they conflict, yet at the same 
time is able to offer some specific utility to each. For state nationalism, it legitimizes 
the rule of the Party-state thus far and promotes a strong and unchallenged 
perpetuation of its leadership as the natural and best form of government for the 
future. For cultural nationalism, it stokes existing sentiments of pride in Chinese 
history and collective identity, and predicts an impending upswing or resurgence in 
the civilization’s well-being. As to whether it is the state or the cultural civilization of 
China that is of greater importance or legitimacy, the bestselling narrative does not 
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decide in favor of one or the other. Instead, it brings the two forms of nationalism 
together in a mutually reinforcing call for the nation to be strong and united in its 
pursuit of the economic development and prosperity that are considered by both to be 
in China’s best interests. 
 
This construct of the nation that prevails is to some extent depoliticized in the ways 
that Zhang Xudong has argued. It associates politics with a turbulence and suffering 
that people would rather consider a thing of the past and lauds the present for having 
sensibly outgrown its foolish political passions. Yet this attitude is not necessarily the 
“ideology-free world”2 or “political and intellectual vacuum”3 that Zhang considers it 
to be. Rather, it is one that consciously opts for the incumbent central government as 
the form of leadership most likely to provide China with the political and social 
stability necessary for the more immediate needs of economic development. This is 
not to say that popular opinion is perfectly satisfied with and unconditionally 
supportive of the ruling Party-state. Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be the case 
as income inequality worsens and popular discontent over issues of land ownership, 
rural and industrial working conditions and bureaucratic corruption boil to the surface 
with increasing frequency. From a broad historical perspective however, the solution 
to these problems is not seen to be the removal of the ruling government and 
introduction of contestational politics, but rather the parallel strengthening and 
improvement of both the nation and its current leadership through, among other 
things, further economic development. 
                                                 
2 Zhang, “Nationalism,” p. 319. 
3 Ibid., p. 324. 
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 Alternative constructions of the nation and its history do, of course, exist. While it is 
in part a product of the agents and agendas of the people, the bestselling narrative is 
by no means a total expression of every view that Chinese people have. 4  
Continuously retraced in various guises through bestselling biographies and memoirs, 
however, this grand historical narrative of the nation is one that achieves a high level 
of circulation in the everyday, mainstream media in urban China today. Furnishing 
one of the primary contexts within which new developments and changes are being 
situated and made meaningful, tracing this popular history thus goes some way 
towards articulating that sense of a distinct but elusive “difference between then and 
now” that Judith Farquhar hesitates to describe.5 The implications of this prevalent 
historical orientation for the future of Chinese political, economic and social-cultural 
development are emergent topics for future research. 
 
                                                 
4 For various alternative opinions recorded in interviews with Chinese people, see Sang Ye, China 
Candid: The People on the People’s Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006). 
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